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Executive summary
with a growing economy at home and widening diplomatic and commercial 
ties across the world, Turkey is increasingly considered to be a rising power. Turkey’s 
government has sought to cement this reputation through, among other strategies, 
active engagement in conflict-affected states, especially in its neighbourhood and  
surrounding regions. This approach has been developed into the foreign policy concept  
of ‘humanitarian diplomacy’.
Alongside traditional security cooperation and mediation efforts, this engagement 
has included the provision of humanitarian and development aid. Turkey’s official aid 
budget has increased dramatically in recent years and is delivered through a range of 
public agencies coordinated by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency 
(TIKA). Turkish non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are also increasingly  
operating in conflict-affected states, which the government sees as part of a multi-
track approach that draws on both state and civilian capacities.
Turkey’s engagement in Somalia deepened substantially following the 2011 famine.  
The government has strengthened diplomatic and commercial relations, hosted inter-
national conferences on the country, pursued mediation efforts and provided support 
for Somalia’s military and police. Relations have primarily focused on the Federal  
Government in Mogadishu, though engagement Somaliland and Puntland is growing.
Somalia has been within the top five largest recipients of official aid from Turkey since 
2011. Coordinated by TIKA in Mogadishu, where most official aid projects have been 
focused, assistance has shifted from humanitarian relief to the provision of bilateral 
development aid primarily focused on physical and social infrastructure, including 
health and education sectors. Capacity building and direct budget support have also 
been provided to the Federal Government in line with a focus on statebuilding.  
Turkish officials are perceived to have been more willing than other donors to provide 
development aid despite ongoing insecurity, and have built close relations with senior 
figures in the Federal Government who they believe should have full ownership over 
development in their country.
After Syria, Somalia is the largest recipient of aid from Turkish civil society. Turkish  
NGOs in Somalia are varied in size, mandate and history. Also operating mainly 
within Mogadishu, many have shifted from providing humanitarian relief to providing 
services and supporting development projects, primarily in the health and education 
sectors. Many have delivered aid directly through Turkish staff and volunteers on the 
ground. However, partly due to insecurity, they are increasingly working through 
Somali partner organisations and focusing on capacity building.
Turkey’s growing role
Turkey and Somalia
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Although this report does highlight a number of areas for improvement, many from  
Somalia’s government and civil society view aid from Turkey positively. This is partially 
explained by Turkey’s identity and cultural proximity to Somalia. However, its develop- 
ment aid is also seen as practical, tangible and efficient, while the scale and quality of  
Turkey’s humanitarian response in 2011 is widely praised. Relative to traditional donors, 
its aid is commonly perceived to be more effective in reaching beneficiaries because 
it is directly delivered on the ground rather than remotely from neighbouring Kenya. 
Indeed, the physical and very visible presence of Turkish aid workers in Mogadishu 
starting in August 2011 was widely welcomed.
Turkey is certainly a popular country in Somalia and its aid has underpinned this  
reputation. But the honeymoon period will not last forever; Turkish aid actors will 
need to be ready to reassess their roles and keep improving how they engage. As is the 
case with the country’s future as a whole, it will be Somalia’s leaders, officials and civil 
society that ultimately influence the impact of Turkish aid. Nonetheless, an explicit 
focus by official and non-governmental Turkish aid agencies on making aid work for 
peace could represent the next progressive step in the evolution of Turkey-Somalia 
relations. This will require addressing risks that aid inadvertently fuels conflict, and 
capitalising on a number of opportunities.
The actions of all international aid agencies operating within the political economy of 
conflict in Somalia cannot help but impact on it. Turkey is no different. This research 
has identified several ways in which Turkish aid agencies may have inadvertently 
fuelled conflict dynamics in Somalia:
 n One of the major initial challenges for agencies from Turkey was their limited  
knowledge of Somalia’s conflict dynamics which, combined with a rush to provide 
large amounts of assistance, may have increased their exposure to risks.
 n Despite often managing aid delivery directly, there is little doubt that in certain 
instances it has been misused or diverted into the war economy, for example through 
looting by armed actors or manipulation by refugee camp ‘gatekeepers’.
 n Turkish relief NGOs have been at risk of aid being manipulated for military or strategic 
purposes as they have been forced to engage with a range of conflict actors – including 
al-Shabaab – to secure humanitarian access, a common challenge for humanitarian 
actors in the country.
 n Close association between the Turkish government and a political elite within the top 
echelons of the Federal Government means that aid may have been directed to specific 
areas based on clan and/or political and economic interests. Elite capture of Turkish  
aid has potentially boosted the influence of certain groups, inadvertently altering 
power relations and conflict dynamics.
 n Financial aid – notably Turkey’s official direct budget support to the Federal Govern-
ment – has been at risk of affording opportunities for corruption, which itself risks  
sustaining patronage politics and the abuse of public office. Turkish officials are,  
however, very aware of the risks of corruption.
 n The geographic concentration of aid to Mogadishu has implications for highly-contested 
regional political dynamics and has risked fuelling perceptions that Turkey is not 
impartial, undermining its diplomatic credibility to foster peace and reconciliation 
processes. This is now changing, however, with plans to expand Turkey’s field of  
operations outside Mogadishu.
 n The Turkish government’s multi-track approach means that the boundaries between  
official aid and promotion of Turkish business are not always clear. While this approach  
offers many potential benefits, it can also, at times, be perceived to undermine its 
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government’s stated commitment to aid that is impartial and exclusively focused on 
Somalia’s development.
 n The multi-track approach of coordination between Turkish state and civil society aid 
agencies – at its peak in response to the 2011 famine – still has more to achieve. Levels 
of coordination and engagement with agencies from other countries are also perceived 
to be low.
Turkey’s positive reputation and extensive engagement in Somalia provide a platform 
for both its government and NGOs to ensure that their aid contributes to long-term 
peace and stability in Somalia. Many Turkish aid actors are open to explicitly focusing 
on supporting peace. Looking forward, a number of opportunities stand out in three 
broad areas:
 1.  Make aid conflict sensitive
 n A conflict-sensitive approach would prove a useful framework for focusing future 
development projects in this direction while ensuring that all aid risks are managed, at 
the very least. This will require a deeper understanding of the context based on conflict 
analysis and wider consultation with varied Somali stakeholders. Turkish agencies will 
also need to be willing to adjust projects based on assessments of their impact on this 
context. A range of Turkish aid actors have already demonstrated their capacity to  
deepen knowledge and adjust projects.
 n While opportunities to reduce aid diversion into the war economy exist through the 
direct delivery approach, as Turkish NGOs begin to reduce their physical presence 
on the ground, greater attention will need to be paid to preventing these risks as their 
model of delivery changes.
 n Aid projects that Turkish aid actors are currently supporting, whether in the infra-
structure, health or education sectors, could be leveraged to indirectly support peace-
building alongside development objectives. Direct support could be provided for 
Somali-led peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives, including through sharing 
Turkish expertise developed in other contexts.
 2.  Encourage statebuilding that works for peace
 n Through existing statebuilding initiatives, Turkish aid actors have an opportunity to 
put the promotion of accountable, inclusive and legitimate political processes at the 
centre of this work, while continuing to encourage Somalia’s leaders to work towards 
a sustainable political settlement. Existing capacity-building initiatives that provide 
training or deploy experts to the Somali government should be further developed.  
The Turkish government could also take a stronger stand on corruption and make itself  
more transparent and accountable, especially with regard to its direct budget support.
 n Through the strong relationships it has established, and building on prior commitments,  
the Turkish government could encourage Somali authorities to engage more with civil 
society and citizens on matters of governance and peace as well as creating spaces and 
forums for this to happen. Turkish NGOs could also directly assist Somali civil society 
groups to play more active roles in the process of statebuilding.
 n As one of the most sensitive aspects of statebuilding, Turkey’s government could play a 
constructive role in carefully assisting with the establishment of regional administrations 
that are genuinely inclusive and participatory. Furthermore, a long-term commitment 
to localised and bottom-up processes of institution building, for example at municipal 
level, may prove to be a productive investment beyond Mogadishu.
Opportunities to 
reduce risk and 
promote peace
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 n Positive prospects exist for the rebalancing of aid by the Turkish government to new 
regions, though this will create its own set of risks and complications that will need to 
be carefully managed. As Turkish agencies extend their reach into other geographic 
areas, they should seek to build closer partnerships with effective Somali civil society 
organisations and work through them rather than risk displacing them.
 3.  Construct stronger partnerships around peace
 n The Turkish government will need to manage carefully its relations with commercial 
actors, making clear that the principles of conflict sensitivity apply to them as well as 
aid agencies. Greater transparency over the difference between economic interests and 
support for Somalia’s development would help tackle misperceptions.
 n A stronger multi-track partnership between official and civil society actors could be 
catalysed around the promotion of peace, in the same way it was created in response 
to the famine in 2011. This could involve Turkish civil society actors shaping a joint 
strategy, which will help to ensure that it is reflective of a wider set of perspectives and 
genuinely multi-track.
 n Given that they face many of the same challenges, Turkish actors could adopt lessons 
learned by other donors who have been engaged in Somalia on a significant scale for 
a sustained period. Meanwhile, other international actors could benefit from under-
standing how Turkey has managed its recent, ambitious engagement in Somalia, what 
challenges it has faced and how these have been overcome.
The domestic and international factors that will shape Turkey’s rise are hard to forecast.  
However, it looks set to continue to play a role in conflict-affected states. Its recent 
experience in Somalia could help further develop the concept of humanitarian  
diplomacy. Four implications stand out for policy makers:
 n There is a need for Turkey to create a much more explicit focus on conflict sensitivity 
and peacebuilding within its emerging national aid strategy, with its aid agencies being 
given a mandate to integrate a focus on peace into their objectives and strategies.
 n There is a need for the provision of development aid to be more coherent with and 
closely tied to the other dimensions of the Turkish government’s broader engagement  
in conflict-affected states, including mediation efforts and its role in the security sector.
 n Cultivating a two-way partnership of coordination and consultation with Turkish civil 
society actors, through a shared focus on addressing conflict and insecurity, could help 
make the multi-track approach an effective reality that maximises the use of Turkey’s 
civilian capacity.
 n Alongside establishing strong relationships with host governments, as Turkey has 
done in Somalia, the focus of engagement should also be on people and the views of 
a broader set of stakeholders, including civil society groups. In order to create more 
responsive governance systems over the long run, legitimacy, accountability and  
inclusiveness should be placed at the centre of support for statebuilding.
Implications for 
humanitarian 
diplomacy
 1  The United States and the United Kingdom were first and second respectively. Global Humanitarian Assistance (2014) Global 
Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014 Development Initiatives.
 2  Focus group discussion, Garowe, 15 February 2014.
Introduction
over the last decade or so, Turkey has become more visible as a global actor. 
The country’s government has pro-actively sought to present Turkey to the world 
as willing to help promote stability in its neighbourhood and surrounding regions. 
Countries affected by conflict and instability have come under the focus of its foreign 
policy and have benefited from Turkey’s expanding overseas aid budget. While much 
of it was focused on the crisis in neighbouring Syria, in 2013 Turkey was the world’s 
third largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance.1 It is not only assistance from 
the Turkish government that has become more visible: a plethora of Turkish NGOs 
are delivering emergency relief and development aid in some of the world’s most 
challenging environments. This increased activity, along with its global expansion of 
diplomatic and economic relations, has marked Turkey’s rise to prominence on the 
international stage.
This report examines Turkey’s recent engagement in Somalia – in particular Turkish 
aid to the country, including both official assistance and that delivered by NGOs.  
The impact assessment of individual aid projects is beyond the scope of this study. Nor 
does it seek to make a broader judgement on the humanitarian or development impact 
of aid from Turkey as a whole, especially given the differences between the numerous  
state and non-state actors involved. Instead, the report highlights the potential risks and  
opportunities presented by Turkey’s aid to Somalia. While Turkey’s positive reputation 
and extensive engagement put both its government and NGOs in a strong position to 
ensure that aid contributes to long-term peace, at the same time Turkish agencies have 
been at risk of inadvertently fuelling conflict dynamics in Somalia. This report makes  
a number of recommendations for tapping into opportunities and averting risks.
This topic is significant for several reasons. First, while there are a number of dimensions 
to Turkey’s engagement in Somalia, aid has come to play a central role in the relation-
ship and so merits attention in its own right. Second, in the words of one Somali civil 
society activist, “Somali people believe that Turkey is the most important partner of 
Somalia. No other country is more important.”2 What Turkey is perceived to do in 
Somalia is highly significant. Somali stakeholders will be the ones who ultimately  
determine their country’s future, but Turkish actors can make a significant contribution 
to peace through their aid. Third, Turkish officials are currently reviewing the country’s  
aid policy, and Turkish NGOs are expanding their sphere of operations. So, Somalia 
presents an invaluable case study to deepen understanding of how Turkish aid can  
be utilised to promote peace and stability in the conflict-affected states where it is 
increasingly being spent. Finally, Turkey’s approach to aid delivery in Somalia has, 
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in some ways, differed from that of the country’s traditional donors. Understanding 
how Turkey engages, and the advantages and disadvantages of its approach, stands to 
inform engagement by the wider international community in Somalia.
The report is divided into four sections. Section One explores Turkey’s rise and its 
role as an emerging donor. In order to provide a contextual framework, Section Two 
focuses on conflict dynamics in Somalia and some of the ways in which international 
aid has interacted with them. Section Three provides an overview of relations between 
Turkey and Somalia, and in particular identifies several characteristics of Turkish aid 
to Somalia. Section Four analyses ways in which Turkish aid may exacerbate conflict  
in Somalia, as well as opportunities for its aid to contribute to lasting peace.
The report is based on research conducted in 2014. It draws on a desk review of  
relevant research papers and reports, as well as media articles. The research team  
conducted a total of 52 key informant interviews, as well as holding several focus group 
discussions. Twelve interviews were carried out in Istanbul and Ankara with Turkish 
diplomats, officials and NGOs. Seven interviews were held in Mogadishu, with Somali 
officials, politicians, NGOs and activists, alongside a focus group discussion with  
20 individuals from various parts of civil society. Nine interviews were held in Garowe, 
Puntland, with officials, politicians and NGOs, while 14 representatives of civil society  
participated in a focus group discussion. 15 interviews were held in Hargeisa, Somali-
land, with officials, politicians, NGOs and businessmen, as well as a focus group  
discussion with 18 representatives of civil society and the business community.  
In Nairobi, eight interviews were carried out with diplomats, donor officials and NGO 
staff. One interview was also conducted in London. A workshop was held in Istanbul  
in May 2014 and was attended by 17 representatives from Turkish government agencies, 
NGOs and research organisations.
Methodology
 3  Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, ‘Africa Regional Information’, www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa, 
accessed on 17 October 2012.
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 5  TIKA (2014) Turkish Development Assistance 2013, (Ankara: TIKA), p 9.
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of their immediate geographical vicinity, as well as their commitment to the stability of their neighbourhoods, therefore 
constitute the principal tenets of a phenomenon referred to as ‘minilateralism.’ See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: 
America and the Crisis of Global Power, (New York: Basic Books), 2012.
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Turkey’s emerging role
turkey is currently the world’s 18th largest economy and a member of the G20. 
Parallel to the country’s growing economic ties with the rest of the world, Turkey’s 
diplomatic reach is expanding at a corresponding pace – in 2009, Turkey announced 
the opening of 33 new embassies alongside an increase in budget and personnel for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Widening its focus beyond its traditional partners 
in the West, Turkey has pursued closer relations with Asian countries and increased 
engagement in Africa, for example hosting a Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in 
2008 and watching exports to the continent grow by 520 per cent between 2003 and 
2011.3 Turkey’s membership of a wide variety of multilateral forums and organisations 
is illustrative of a diplomatic reach that cuts across usual groupings.4 Turkey’s overseas 
aid increased from US$120 million in 1999 to an estimated US$3.3 billion by 2013.5
Taken together, these strands of Turkey’s global reach contribute to its image as a 
power on the rise. Turkey’s rising power status also derives its authority from a Turkish 
foreign policy that prioritises engagement with its neighbourhood and wider region, 
encompassing the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian, Central Asia, the Middle East, 
North Africa and the Horn of Africa, including Somalia. Turkey’s rise has been under-
pinned by changing dynamics, both internally and externally.
At the global level, the end of the Cold War saw Turkey lose its role as the eastern  
bulwark of a Western security alliance.6 The events of 11 September 2001, the ensuing  
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Arab Uprisings in the Middle East and North 
Africa saw Turkey’s regional landscape – and its role within it – shift significantly.  
At the same time Turkey’s rise should also be seen against the backdrop of a new 
emerging global order, characterised by a rebalancing of power between states and  
the advent of bodies such as the G20 and the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa grouping (BRICS). Overall, emerging countries such as Turkey have come to 
play bigger roles in international politics, especially at the regional level.7
Turkey as an 
emerging 
global actor
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 8  Christie-Miller A, ‘Turkey takes the lead in rebuilding Somalia’ in The Christian Science Monitor, 5 June 2012.
 9  GDP grew at an average rate of six per cent between 2002 and 2008, increasing to over eight per cent in 2011 following 
the global financial crisis. Economic interaction with the rest of the world has mattered for this growth. Whereas trade 
accounted for just 17.1 per cent of GDP in 1980, it accounted for 52.3 per cent by 2008 Evin A, Kiris¸ci K, Linden, R, 
Straubhaar T, Tocci T, Tolay J, & Walker J (2010) Getting to Zero: Turkey, its neighbours and the West Transatlantic Academy, 
p 23.
 10  Davutog˘lu A (2001), Stratejik Derinlik, (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları).
 11  United Nations Peacekeeping Statistics, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/, accessed on 19 May 2014.
 12  ‘Number of countries requesting police training from Turkey rises’, (2012), Anadolu Agency, 27 August 2012.
 13  Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation’, www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-
mediation.en.mfa, accessed 11 October 2012.
 14  Bayer R & Keyman F (2012), ‘Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization and Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?’, 
Globalizations 9.1, p 84.
 15  See Aras B (2014), ‘Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited’ in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies and 
Cornell S (2012), ‘What drives Turkish Foreign Policy?’ in Middle East Quarterly Winter 2012, p 24.
 16  See, for example, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014), ‘Policy of Zero Problems with Neighbors’,  
www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa
Equally significant to Turkey’s rise have been changes within the country itself. Follow-
ing the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) landslide electoral victory in 2002, the 
parameters of Turkish foreign policy have been redefined. On the one hand, the new 
government sought to demonstrate to the world that Turkey is a proactive player in 
regional and global politics. On the other hand, the narrative of Turkey’s rise has been 
presented to a domestic audience as the outcome of its successful leadership.8 Further-
more, a period of relative political stability and the implementation of critical reforms 
at home, though still turbulent and incomplete, have bolstered the government’s self-
confidence in foreign policy. While it has recently slowed, economic growth over the 
past decade has also underpinned Turkey’s rise.9
Since coming to power in 2002, the Turkish government has sought to strengthen its 
global role through active engagement in the problems faced by its immediate neigh-
bours and in surrounding regions. The Turkish government has explicitly tried to  
reinvigorate relations with its wider region through building on historical, cultural,  
religious, political and economic ties. Turkish policy makers argue that these numerous  
ties are an asset which place Turkey in a unique position to promote stability. As such, 
given the international community’s interests in this oft-turbulent area, Turkey’s  
position is believed to make it both a regional power and a strategically important 
global actor.10
Turkey has provided traditional security assistance to conflict-affected states within 
and beyond its neighbouring regions. Turkish participation in United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping rose after the end of the Cold War.11 Turkey has funded training  
programmes for military and police in numerous countries, including in Afghanistan, 
where it also provided troops to international forces in the country.12
Another way in which Turkey has sought to promote stability in the wider region has 
been through diplomacy and peace mediation. For example, Turkish policy states 
that the government “attaches special importance to preventative diplomacy, pioneers 
a great deal of mediation attempts in a wide geography and endeavours actively for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes”.13 Examples include efforts by Turkey to mediate 
between Israel and Hamas and competing factions within Palestine, attempts to  
promote Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq and the hosting of talks between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.14
However, Turkey’s attempts to promote stability in its wider region have not always 
proven successful.15 Aspirations have often outstretched capacities. Furthermore,  
policy has been severely tested by events beyond Turkey’s control. For example, the 
Arab Uprisings seriously tested the government’s ‘zero-problems with neighbours’  
policy, which prioritises peace with and within neighbouring countries as fundamental  
to domestic peace.16 Indeed it is the prolonged crisis in Syria, on Turkey’s doorstep, 
that has perhaps most clearly demonstrated the limits of Turkish influence. Finally, 
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 17  ‘Final Declaration of the Fifth Annual Ambassadors Conference’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 3 January 2012, 
accessed 30 April 2014, www.mfa.gov.tr/final_declaration_of_the_fifth_annual_ambassadors_conference.en.mfa
 18  Ibid. Also see Keyman F & Sazak O (2014), ‘Turkey as a Humanitarian State’, POMEAS, Paper No 2. 
 19  Davutog˘lu A (2013), ‘Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects,’ The Journal of Nationalism  
and Ethnicity 32 (2013), p 865.
 20  Akpinar P (2014), ‘Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy’ in Turkish Studies 14 (4),  
pp 735–757.
 21  Ibid.
 22  TIKA (2013) Turkish Development Assistance 2012, (Ankara: TIKA), p 12. 
 23  The United States and the United Kingdom were first and second respectively. Op cit. Global Humanitarian Assistance 
(2014). 
 24  Op cit. TIKA (2014), p 12 and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2012) Statistics on resource flows 
to developing countries, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm, accessed on  
25 October 2012.
 25  For example, while it provided US$1.2 billion in 2011, the same year it received more aid than ever before, at US$3.2 billion. 
See Global Humanitarian Assistance (2014) Turkey, www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/turkey
 26  Murphy T & Sazak O (2012), ‘Turkey’s Civilian Capacity in Post Conflict Reconstruction’, (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center), p 3.
 27  Representing nearly Turkey’s entire aid budget at the time, in 1992 total aid to the Central Asia peaked at just over US$1 
billion. However, Turkey’s aid to Central Asia fell short of its objectives and was reduced. Wheeler T (2013), Background 
Briefing: Turkey’s Engagement with Central Asia (London: Saferworld).
challenges within Turkey, whether related to armed conflict with Kurdish groups or 
wider dynamics of state-society relations and the consolidation of democracy, have  
put limits on the attention given to foreign policy issues and risked undermining the 
relative domestic stability that has underpinned growing engagement overseas.
These challenges have not dented Ankara’s promotion of the concept of ‘humanitarian  
diplomacy’. Policy makers use humanitarian diplomacy to frame Turkey’s recent  
foreign policy and determine its future direction.17 While still a largely undefined  
and evolving concept, in policy rhetoric humanitarian diplomacy claims to reject  
realpolitik in international relations and to take people and human dignity as an alter-
native point of reference.18 Writing when he was foreign minister, Turkey’s current 
prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, argued:
“On the one hand, this new stance underscores our endeavours to find solutions to crises, 
in particular within our region. On the other hand, it is a perspective that embraces the 
whole of mankind and aims to shoulder the responsibility of dealing with the full range  
of issues occupying the minds and consciences of mankind.” 19
Largely shaped by the events of the Arab Uprisings, the concept of humanitarian  
diplomacy is understood by policymakers to serve Turkey’s national interests and 
allow it to adapt to contemporary regional and global dynamics. Moreover, it is argued 
that Turkey deploys a ‘multi-track’ approach to humanitarian diplomacy, where  
multiple actors, including NGOs and business associations, shape and implement its 
foreign policy.20
The expansion of Turkish aid is also considered a core component of its humanitarian  
diplomacy.21 Turkey’s total official development assistance in 2013 (the last year for 
which figures are publicly available) was approximately US$3.3 billion, a more than 
five-fold increase since 2005.22 As well as being the world’s third largest bilateral donor 
of humanitarian assistance in 2013, as a percentage of Gross National Income, Turkey 
was also the world’s most generous.23 However, it has not only been the state which 
has increased its aid: assistance from Turkish NGOs amounted to US$280.2 million in 
2013, an increase from US$56.7 million in 2005.24 However, it is important to note that, 
as with many other emerging donors, Turkey is still an aid recipient.25
Turkey first began to experiment with small development assistance programs in 
1985.26 The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), was established  
in 1992 to deepen ties with the newly-independent Turkic states of Central Asia, where 
the majority of Turkey’s aid was focused.27
Following a decline in Turkey’s aid in the 1990s, the current government has been able 
to draw on economic growth at home to finance increased giving overseas. Aid has 
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Africa and Central Asia’ in European Journal of Development Research Vol. 24 No. 2 p 266.
 29  Hurriyet (2012), ‘Turkey donates $1.3 billion to poor countries’ in Hurriyet News, 23 April 2012.
been used as a means to visibly demonstrate that Turkey is helping to address shared 
global challenges. For example, the new government committed itself to helping meet 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and gradually increasing assistance as 
a means to do so.28 Turkey also hosted the 4th UN Conference on Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) in Istanbul in May 2011, and committed to earmarking US$200  
million available to LDCs annually from 2012.29 Turkey has also indicated that it will 
make global development one of the key issues on the G20’s agenda when it takes over 
the G20 Presidency in 2015.
Figure 2. Ten largest recipients of Turkish development assistance 2013 
Source: TIKA (2014) Turkish Development Assistance 2013, TIKA, p 11
Figure 1: Total Turkish Official Overseas Aid (2005–2013, US$ million)  
Source: TIKA (2014) Turkish Development Assistance 2013, TIKA, p 9
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Over the last few years, Turkey has increased the number of countries it provides aid to,  
reflecting a wish to widen Turkey’s diplomatic reach and network of global partners.  
For example, aid to African countries was increased alongside an intensified diplomatic  
engagement with the continent, with 2005 being declared the ‘Year of Africa’.  
The Turkish government has also sought to link aid to Turkey’s economic interests. 
Aid, for example spent on technical assistance or on infrastructure development, is 
seen as a means to combine economic and development relations for both Turkey  
and the recipient country.
In line with its broader foreign policy, much of Turkey’s aid is channelled to states 
affected by conflict. According to its MFA, Turkey has purposefully “boosted its  
overseas development assistance to various countries affected by conflicts and other 
Aid to conflict-affected 
states
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sources of instability”.30 Since 2008, TIKA has coordinated official assistance in 
response to conflicts in Iraq, Georgia and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.31 
Afghanistan is a prominent recipient of Turkish aid to conflict contexts. Turkey has 
committed over US$30 million for two Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 
which have focused on reconstruction efforts and the provision of health care,  
education, police training and supporting alternative livelihoods. Through its aid  
programme, Turkey has also deployed approximately 220 civilian experts and advisors 
to the country.32 Significant aid was also provided to post-revolution Egypt, Libya 
and Tunisia following the instability of the Arab Uprisings. More recently, however, 
conflict closer to home has been of greatest concern to Turkey, with Syria the largest 
recipient of Turkish aid in 2012 and 2013, mostly in the form of assistance to Syrian 
refugees in Turkey.33
Several broad Turkish perspectives on both official and civil society aid to conflict-
affected states are worth briefly noting. First, Turkish aid actors, both official and  
non-governmental, argue that seclusion of relief workers into restricted secure zones 
or their total removal from conflict zones creates an efficacy problem and stokes  
distrust among local people. It is perceived that Turkish relief agencies, on the other 
hand, prefer to live in close proximity to and operate in conflict zones with a high 
degree of visibility. This is seen to be an important means through which to build trust 
with national authorities and local communities.
Second, political and ideological conditions to aid are rejected. Turkish officials have 
stated that “our principle is not to interfere with the domestic policies of certain aid 
recipients”.34 Equally, Turkey’s government claims it does not seek to actively promote 
democracy overseas.35 While support for statebuilding is central to Turkey’s approach 
to conflict-affected states, it is seen that this must be apolitical and focused only on 
the reinstatement of basic state institutions and services, not an imposition of political 
models.
Third, while financial assistance is an important component of Turkey’s aid, the  
government stresses that the priority is “technical cooperation for development of 
institutional capacity and human resources in partner countries”.36 Turkey seeks to 
build capacity, especially of recipient state institutions, by deploying both civil servants 
and civil society, actors who are seen to command a vast reserve of skills in rebuilding  
war-torn societies. In line with its multi-track approach, both government agencies and 
NGOs are understood to play a role in the coordination, diffusion, and implementation 
of Turkey’s ‘civilian capacity’.37
Turkey provides several different types of development assistance: Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF) – which includes financial  
support for security services that cannot counted as ODA – private sector flows with 
a development impact, and aid from Turkish civil society. ODA is itself broken down 
into social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, production sectors and other  
flows (including emergency aid, peacebuilding operations, refugees and contributions 
to international organisations). Despite Turkey’s participation in a broad range of  
multilateral forums, it continues to provide most ODA through bilateral channels.  
Official aid modalities
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For example, in 2012 only US$110million of Turkey’s ODA was provided through  
multilateral organisations.38
TIKA is the key agency involved in the delivery of Turkey’s overseas aid. Poverty  
eradication and sustainable development in partner countries have become a priority  
for TIKA’s work, especially following the renewal of its mandate in 2011 under the 
Office of the Prime Minister.39 It now works in over 100 countries with permanent 
offices in 30. In general, TIKA plays a number of roles.40 First, it has its own internal  
aid budget which is spent on projects in partner countries, either at the request of its 
country offices and embassies or following commitments from high-level officials. 
Second, it implements aid projects that are funded by other government ministries  
or directly authorised by the Prime Minister’s Office.
Third, TIKA coordinates the numerous other government and public agencies that 
provide ODA.41 These include the Ministries of Education, Health, Culture and 
Economy and Commerce, public entities such as TOKI (the Housing Development 
Administration) and public universities. Through Turkey’s Ministry of Interior, the 
police provide aid in the form of training programmes, while some contributions 
from the Turkish Armed Forces (largely categorised as ‘peacebuilding operations’) are 
considered ODA. In line with its focus on conflict-affected states, emergency aid from 
Turkey has also increased rapidly. The Disaster and Emergency Management Agency 
(AFAD), established in 2009 as separate entity under the Office of the Prime Minister, 
provided US$38.6 million in international assistance in 2012.42 Kizilay – the Turkish 
Red Crescent – is considered a public entity and is the largest disperser of relief ODA 
from Turkey. However, it also receives public donations, works independently from 
state institutions and shares several characteristics with NGOs.
In the past 20 years Turkey’s civil society sector has grown in size, has seen a change  
in its focus and coverage, and seen a redefinition of its relations with the state. The 
combination of economic liberalisation and an easing of social restrictions and laws  
as part of Turkey’s candidacy for the EU further widened the space and funding for 
non-governmental actors willing to establish autonomous associations. The wars in 
the Balkans, in conjunction with the easing of domestic restrictions, spurred the  
emergence of humanitarian NGOs working overseas for the first time in the 1990s.43 
The 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey was a significant event that led to the creation 
of several new NGOs specialising in emergency response, many of which subsequently 
began to work outside Turkey.44
Just as ODA has grown, a wide range of Turkish NGOs have been able to capitalise on 
a booming Turkish economy over the last decade and mobilise significant donations 
from the public. Today an array of faith- and rights-based organisations, professional 
associations, and special-interest groups are active both nationally and internationally. 
Despite the diverse character of Turkish NGOs working overseas, many share a focus on 
humanitarian aid, providing basic social services and development projects (especially 
in the health and education sectors) and providing technical capacity-building assistance.
Civil society
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The recent growth in Turkish development and humanitarian assistance, particularly 
to conflict-affected states, has been a significant element of Turkey’s rising power  
status. Yet the pace at which Turkish official aid programmes have expanded over the 
last decade has often exceeded the capacity of existing institutions to manage them.  
Furthermore, the number of government bodies involved has complicated the provision 
of development aid, which has tended to be driven by ad-hoc and short-term requests 
rather than longer-term country strategies.45 The Turkish government is currently 
undertaking a process of clarifying and institutionalising its aid policies with the 
drafting of a new aid law and aid strategy. Turkey’s non-governmental aid agencies 
face their own set of challenges and processes of evolution. With established funding 
bases, they will no doubt continue to play a visible role overseas. How explicitly they 
tie themselves to the government’s approach is open to question, especially given the 
changing dynamics of politics at home. However, it is clear that the future of Turkish 
aid, from both governmental and non-governmental actors, will be greatly shaped by 
their experiences in conflict-affected states today. 
Looking forward
 2
The Somali context
somalia has been a theatre of conflict since the fall of the Siad Barre 
regime in 1991. Clan conferences held in the 1990s led to relative stability in the self-
declared but internationally unrecognised independent state of Somaliland and, to 
a lesser extent, the autonomous region of Puntland. Peace has been more elusive in 
South-Central Somalia. A Transitional Federal Government (TFG), established in 
2004 and backed by troops from the African Union (AU) and neighbouring countries 
struggled in a conflict with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) movement, which by  
2006 had taken control of Mogadishu. Despite the absorption of some ICU leaders 
into the TFG following a peace agreement in 2009, al-Shabaab – originally the youth 
wing of the ICU – continued to violently oppose the government, emerging as the 
main opposition to the government and controlling large areas of territory.
Alongside the retreat of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and territorial gains by the  
government and AU forces in 2011, the ending of the government’s transitional period 
and the election of a new leadership bought renewed optimism to Somalia in 2012. 
Many felt the country had turned a corner. However, widespread domestic and inter-
national support for the government has waned as it has struggled to manage the 
problems it has inherited. Al-Shabaab has proved able to launch asymmetric attacks, 
maintain territory and remain a serious security threat, despite the killing of its  
leader in a September 2014 US airstrike. Continuing to rely on a contested system of 
proportional clan representation, the government has struggled to make progress in 
reconciling clans so as to provide a basis for a sustainable political settlement between 
them.
The mandate of the current government expires in 2016, when elections are scheduled 
to take place. The constitution has yet to be fully agreed; a “winner takes all” approach 
to political power and allegations of corruption further exacerbate problems. Disputes 
surrounding the process of federalism and the negotiation and recognition of regional 
state authorities in recovered territories in South-Central have created a serious risk 
of renewed clan conflict. Finally, the continued strength of clan militias poses a major 
challenge to the creation of state-controlled security and police forces. For the foresee-
able short-term future, and even with the ousting of al-Shabaab from the territory it 
controls, these issues will prove serious obstacles for Somalia as it moves down the 
path of peace and stability.
Somalia’s 
conflict
 saferworld and istanbul policy center  11 
 46  Ayittey G (1994), ‘The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution’, Cato Institute – Policy Analysis 205.
 47  Geopolitical interests meant that the manipulation and misuse of aid was widely tolerated by foreign donors. During 
Somalia’s conflict with Ethiopia in the late 1970s, relief aid for refugees was diverted by Siad Barre’s government and 
provided to troops while refugee camps were used to recruit, train and encamp them. One US aid monitor in Somalia 
estimated in 1981 that “two thirds of the aid was stolen by the military right from the docks in Mogadishu or from the 
refugee camps”. See Warsame H A (2011), ‘Role of International Aid and Open Trade Policies in Rebuilding the Somali State’, 
Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 11 (10), p 55. Also see Menkhaus K (2008), ‘International Policies and 
Politics in the Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia’ in Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 4, October 2008.
 48  By the mid-1980s, 100 per cent of Somalia’s development budget was funded by aid. See Ayittey G (1994). This aid arguably 
created a “bloated and unsustainable central government unresponsive to its own people”. Menkhaus K (1997), ‘US Foreign 
Assistance to Somalia: Phoenix from the ashes?’ Middle East Policy 5 (1).
 49  Op cit. Menkhaus (1997), p 138.
 50  Bradbury M (2010), ‘State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia’ Briefing Paper – Feinstein 
International Center, p 4.
 51  Op cit. Bradbury M (2010), p 8.
 52  Warsame H A (2011), ‘Role of International Aid and Open Trade Policies in Rebuilding the Somali State’, Bildhaan: An 
International Journal of Somali Studies 11 (10), p 53.
 53  In 2008, Somalia accounted for two-thirds of all aid workers killed worldwide; Bradbury (2010), p 6.
 54  Their operations were made more complex by US legislation that banned any type of support, direct or not, to proscribed 
terrorist organisations, including al-Shabaab. See Bradbury (2010), p 6.
 55  BBC (2013), ‘Somalia famine “killed 260,000 people’’’ in BBC News, 2 May 2013.
 56  Global Humanitarian Assistance (2012) Somalia: International financing investments Development Initiatives.
 57  Op cit. Bradbury (2010), p 10 and Seal, A & Bailey R (2013), ‘The 2011 Famine in Somalia: lessons learnt from a failed 
response?’ in Conflict and Health Vol. 7, No. 22.
External aid has long been a feature of Somalia’s internal dynamics. Huge sums were 
invested following its independence in the 1960s, but with little sustainable impact, 
leading some to title the country ‘the graveyard of foreign aid’.46 Somalia’s strategic 
importance during the Cold War period saw aid flow to the country from first East  
and then West.47 Somalia was to become the largest recipient of aid in sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1980s.48 But in 1989, with the logic of the Cold War diluted, Western 
donors suspended aid following the Somali government’s heavy-handed repression  
of an armed uprising in Somaliland.49
Following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the response to famine in 1992, 
aid to the country slowly reduced in the nineties, with few aid agencies operating on 
the ground by 1997. However, the events of 9/11 raised concerns about the potential for 
so-called ‘failed states’ like Somalia to become breeding grounds for terrorist groups. 
These concerns put the country back on the international radar and steered efforts to 
revive a functioning state, including through aid to back the establishment of the  
transitional government.50
The intensity of conflict in Somalia contributed to humanitarian crises.51 In 2008  
and 2009, 3.2 million of Somalia’s estimated nine million people required urgent 
humanitarian assistance.52 Despite increases in aid, insecurity became a major barrier 
for humanitarian access to populations in need.53 In 2009 and 2010, many aid agencies 
were forced to reduce greatly or withdraw their humanitarian operations in South-
Central Somalia, especially after al-Shabaab declared that they would be considered 
‘legitimate targets’.54
In July 2011, famine led to the largest humanitarian crisis in Somalia for two decades.  
Nearly 260,000 people died.55 Somalia became second-largest recipient of humanitarian 
aid in the world.56 The withdrawal of al-Shabaab’s forces from Mogadishu partially 
increased the space for aid agencies to operate on the ground in the city, where  
internally displaced persons (IDPs) were arriving in substantial numbers. Nonetheless, 
high levels of insecurity across much of South-Central Somalia alongside restricted 
access to al-Shabaab-held areas meant that many aid agencies relied on remote  
management, with activities often implemented through or in partnership with  
Somali NGOs, contractors and authorities.57
Since 2011 agencies have slowly increased their presence on the ground and begun to 
move away from remote management, although many continue to support and work 
through national partners as a means of building local capacity. While the famine 
was declared over by early 2012, many in Somalia continued to need urgent assistance 
throughout 2012 and 2013. In July 2014, analysts were warning that a combination of 
Overview of aid 
to Somalia
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below-average rainfall, rising food prices and insecurity has caused a renewed crisis, 
raising the possibility of a return to famine conditions.58
Figure 3: Humanitarian assistance and other ODA (excluding debt relief) to Somalia,  
2002–2012 (US$ million)59
 Total official  Other ODA 
 humanitarian  (excluding Total 
 assistance debt relief) ODA
2002 145 99 243
2003 153 103 256
2004 168 91 259
2005 205 90 295
2006 340 111 451
2007 289 127 415
2008 579 193 773
2009 557 140 696
2010 253 270 524
2011 752 232 985
2012 627 373 1000
As noted, humanitarian aid has not been the only form of assistance to Somalia in 
recent years. All of Somalia’s major donors have included support for development 
initiatives in their aid allocations to Somalia. For example, USAID supports education, 
the development of the Somali business sector, livestock and farming, and the creation 
of an investment-friendly environment.60 A range of NGOs have implemented projects 
in similar sectors. The majority of donor-funded development projects have been 
implemented alongside or through Somali actors. Many have focused on relatively  
stable regions of Somalia and Somaliland.
Figure 4: Reported top ten donors of total ODA (2011–12 average), US$ million61
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Donors have also focused resources on dealing with Somalia’s insecurity. A significant 
amount of funding (albeit often not technically defined as ODA) has been spent on 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, and on training government 
military forces. Some donors have also sought to support peace through development 
programming, for example through creating employment for young men or through  
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delivering ‘peace dividends’ to relatively stable areas. Some assistance has been explicitly 
focused on peacebuilding initiatives, for instance through supporting processes of 
reconciliation.
Beyond these initiatives, significant donor attention has gone to strengthening the 
capacity and reach of state institutions. In the 1990s, some support of this kind was 
focused on the autonomous region of Puntland and the self-declared state of Somali- 
land.62 However, since 2004, attention has been increasingly – though not consistently – 
focused on the government in Mogadishu. The TFG was initially provided with direct 
aid for the payment of civil servants, members of parliaments and the security sector.63 
Between 2009 and 2012, a variety of donors collectively channelled at least US$57.8 
million to the TFG.64 Beyond direct budget support, aid was also spent on technical 
assistance for institution building at all levels of government. However, despite these 
efforts, the transitional governments from 2004 to 2012 never managed to develop 
meaningful capacity.65
The international community agreed in September 2013 on a ‘New Deal’ to renew 
Somalia’s state, promote peacebuilding and catalyse development. With ambitions to 
move beyond business as usual, the process led to the creation of a Somali Compact, 
which identified five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (inclusive politics, security, 
justice, economic foundations and revenues and services) developed with the new 
government.66 Its aim is for aid to be aligned with Somali-owned and led priorities, 
and delivered in partnership with and increasingly through government institutions, 
including through direct budget support. In September 2013, international donors  
pledged to provide Somalia with US$2.4 billion of aid over the coming years to support 
the implementation of the Somali Compact.67 However, to date, the release of this 
funding has been slow due to delays in the development of concrete plans, political 
uncertainty in the Mogadishu government and concerns about financial management 
and corruption.
Aid and violent conflict are intricately interrelated. The violence and disruption caused 
by conflict often generates an urgent need for aid, especially humanitarian assistance, 
while at the same time creating conditions of insecurity that can obstruct its provision. 
Concurrently, while aid does not cause conflict, research shows “that even when it is 
effective in doing what it is intended to do – to save lives or promote development –  
aid too often also feeds into, reinforces and prolongs conflict”.68
Aid continues to be part and parcel of the political economy of Somalia’s conflict at all 
levels. Attempts to “restore peace and security to Somalia are critically undermined by 
a corrosive war economy”.69 The diversion of international aid into this war economy 
is a major risk. Humanitarian aid has been diverted from the point it enters Somalia, 
including at Mogadishu’s port, where the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group 
(SEMG) has alleged more than US$3.4 million worth of aid was diverted during the 
How has aid 
risked fuelling 
conflict in 
Somalia?
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2011 famine.70 In 2010, the SEMG alleged that a “handful of Somali contractors for aid 
agencies have formed a cartel and become important powerbrokers — some of whom 
channel their profits — or the aid itself — directly to armed opposition groups”.71 
According the SEMG, contracts with Somali businessmen for the delivery of food aid 
have constituted one of the largest sources of revenue in the country.72 Furthermore, 
aid delivery has in some cases “become a militarized business, with businessmen 
maintaining their own militias in order to protect their warehouses, convoys and  
distribution points … contractors have maintained some of the largest private militias 
in southern Somalia”.73
The phenomenon of ‘gatekeepers’, who control the delivery of aid to end users, 
emerged in response to high flows of IDPs to Mogadishu in 2011. While not a new 
phenomenon and by no means uniform, gatekeepers were often clan-based and linked 
to local militias and powerful local officials.74 Taking control of IDP camps, they were 
able to charge aid agencies for access, manipulate the delivery of aid, inflate numbers  
of beneficiaries and divert aid for consumption or sale in local markets.75 In these ways, 
IDPs were essentially used as pawns to attract aid resources. Despite humanitarian 
imperatives, by working alongside or through gatekeepers, aid agencies risked  
reinforcing these power dynamics.76
As is the case in many conflict zones, access to those in need by humanitarian agencies 
must be negotiated with armed actors who are in control, whether they are militias, 
regional authorities or representatives of the federal state itself.77 As the SEMG 
reported in 2013, “all armed actors in Somalia subjected humanitarian organizations 
to taxation, illegal roadblocks, intimidation and extortion.”78 Extorted aid resources, 
taxes and fees can create a direct source of material support for the war effort. In 2009, 
al-Shabaab controlled an immense territory with around 5 million inhabitants, and  
an Office for the Supervision of the Affairs for Foreign Agencies was established.79  
Agencies often had to negotiate on regulations, travel permits, registration fees, taxes 
and the hiring of staff.80 Between 2009 and 2012, al-Shabaab banned several agencies 
and imposed new taxes and conditions on those that were allowed to continue  
operations.81 A further risk is that without appropriate safeguards, the way aid is  
distributed, and where it ends up, may be unduly influenced to serve military objectives,  
and this can create opportunities for conflict actors’ control over local populations.
Aid can also inadvertently lead to violent conflict between different groups or  
individuals if its distribution is deemed unfair. As one participant in a focus group 
discussion in Garowe explained, “If there is no equality over who gets it, who does 
not, then you have problems.”82 These dynamics can play out at all levels, ranging 
from localised intra-clan disputes at community level, conflicts within larger areas 
or regions, to conflict at the national level. In a state like Somalia, characterised by 
inter-group competition and weakened local mediating systems, competition over 
the control of aid and its distribution is tightly bound up with conflict dynamics. One 
long-time observer of aid to Somalia paints a bleak picture: “The aid system is pretty 
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rotten as a whole. The majority of organizations are part and parcel of local power 
structures. This has implications for conflict with regard to who has control over the 
aid tap, who receives assistance and who doesn’t.”83 According to some analysts, the 
state sits at the centre of these dynamics:
“Since 1960, one of the most important roles of the Somali state has been as a catchment 
point through which foreign aid is funnelled into the country. This unintentionally  
reinforced a ‘Mogadishu bias’ in modern Somali political culture, a centralization of 
political life and competition in the capital, the point at which foreign aid entered the 
country and was allocated.” 84
Aid captured through control of the state has been used to maintain a system of 
patronage politics along clan lines. In many cases lucrative state functions have 
become privatised or even criminalised as the “pursuit of power and profit has become 
indistinguishable”.85 It appears that these problems have proved difficult to bring under 
control despite the arrival of a new administration in 2012. The SEMG argued in 2013 
that “the misappropriation of public resources continues in line with past practices”86  
and that the “system inherited by the new government is in many ways beyond its  
control, while at times political decisions and appointments have exacerbated conditions  
of corruption”.87 Although heavily disputed, it has gone as far as to allege that “some  
80 per cent of withdrawals from the Central Bank are made for private purposes and 
not for the running of government”.88 In some regards, those in control of the state 
have often focused on attaining further external resources rather than raising domestic 
revenue, building a social contract with society or establishing systems of governance 
appropriate to Somalia’s context.
There is a clear logic to support for statebuilding in Somalia, where state failure 
arguably lies at the root of insecurity, humanitarian crisis and underdevelopment.89 
Several factors have made such support especially challenging, including a uniquely 
protracted period of collapse, Somalia’s political culture, a low domestic revenue base 
and numerous vested interests in continued state weakness.90 But continued aid for 
top-down statebuilding as currently conceived may simply entrench the economic 
and political logic of the status quo. Indeed, some point to the example of Somaliland 
where there appears to be an inverse relationship between levels of aid and the success 
of institution building.91 Some of the most successful cases of institution building in 
Somalia have come from the ground up at the local level, autonomously driven by 
cooperation between diverse sets of official and non-state actors.92
A wider problem looms for statebuilding in Somalia. Governments that have appeared 
on paper to represent national unity have often in fact been “coalitions of a small 
number of clans and factions” that are not representative, responsive and accountable 
enough to foster national unity in practice.93 One group’s control of state institutions 
is perceived to be at the expense of others, especially given the state’s history not only 
as a catchment point for foreign aid but as a tool of violent oppression and predatory 
behaviour. The stronger the state, the higher the stakes. The federal model emerged as 
a response to these concerns, but the lack of clarity around formation and division of 
powers means that statebuilding will remain an inherently conflict-generating process 
until it is based on a strong political settlement deemed legitimate by the majority of 
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Somalia’s stakeholders. Furthermore, any lasting settlement will require far deeper 
levels of reconciliation on a range of issues such as inter-clan grievances for past and 
ongoing acts of violence and disputes over historical rights to land.94
Given the absence of any meaningful central state, donors in the late 2000s 
approached statebuilding through a ‘building blocks’ approach that concentrated 
attention and resources on the regional authorities that did exist. This may minimise 
some risks associated with support to a central state while creating opportunities for 
more ground-up approaches to statebuilding. However, dynamics that play out at the 
centre, including those related to the capture of institutions by certain groups, also 
play out at the regional level while regionalism itself creates its own set of winners 
and losers.
Any assessment of the risks associated with delivering aid in Somalia needs to be  
qualified. First, there is no doubt that aid has benefited many people in Somalia. Vital  
humanitarian aid has saved countless lives. Many development projects have undeniably 
improved the livelihoods of their beneficiaries. Efforts to support institutions have in 
some cases been successful, especially through long-term support to hybrid systems  
of governance at the local level.95
Second, the majority of those involved in the delivery of aid are well aware of the risks 
and have taken actions to reduce them. For example, humanitarian and development 
actors have reduced risks of diversion through the use of third-party monitoring  
systems and improved the management of IDP camps, and 27 agencies have endorsed 
guidelines for risk management best practice in an attempt to harmonise NGO 
approaches to risk mitigation.96 The UN has created a Risk Management Unit intended 
to tackle problems such as those associated with the use of contractors. Principles  
and guidelines for aid agencies to ‘do no harm’, so critically important in a context  
like Somalia, are taken seriously by many agencies and have underpinned difficult 
decisions to withdraw humanitarian support.97 Donors and aid agencies have sought 
to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches to their development projects, for example  
through supporting community-level governance structures to manage the distribution  
of aid benefits. Indeed Somali stakeholders frequently point to examples of how aid can 
help to promote peace, for example through bringing together fighting communities  
or the creation of viable alternatives to the war economy.98 Donors providing aid to 
the Federal Government have tried to use mechanisms such as fiduciary agents or 
proposed joint financial management systems as a means to reduce opportunities for 
manipulation.
There is, of course, room for considerable improvement. Full and consistent commit-
ment to principles and guidelines to ‘do no harm’ remains patchy while a “culture 
of denial and secrecy continues to exist that prevents the humanitarian community 
from sharing bad experiences, learning hard lessons and developing common tools”.99 
Meanwhile, some in the aid community believe that “INGOs have hundreds of  
processes and checks and balances but aid still gets diverted”.100 And, as one donor  
official admits, “we still have so much to learn about being conflict sensitive in Somalia.  
It is a huge challenge.”101 Increased awareness as to the risks of support for statebuilding  
has proved hard to translate into practice, meaning that “many institution-building 
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projects continue to possess similar features of past projects”, including with regard to 
aid to the Federal Government in Mogadishu.102
Despite their shortcomings, such efforts to reduce risk highlight a third and crucial 
point, which is that the impact of aid on conflict dynamics is greatly determined by 
the way in which it is delivered. A range of Somali actors, who are by no means merely 
passive recipients of aid, play active roles in shaping the processes of its distribution in 
the country. Nonetheless, a deeper understanding of the context and a greater willing-
ness to accept their own responsibilities will put those outside actors providing aid in 
a much better position to reduce risks of conflict and maximise opportunities to build 
peace. This applies to aid from Turkey, one of Somalia’s increasingly influential donors.
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 3
Turkey’s engagement  
in Somalia
although fairly peripheral, officials from both Turkey and Somalia frequently 
reference the fact that historical relations between the countries were established during  
the Ottoman period.103 While Turkey first established an embassy in Mogadishu in 
1979, provided some development aid in the 1980s and took part in the UN missions  
of the early 1990s, it is not until relatively recently that the modern Turkish Republic 
has deepened its engagement in Somalia.
The Turkish government initially engaged in Somalia through multilateral forums. 
Turkey’s recent engagement in Somalia dates back to January 2007, when Turkey’s 
prime minister met with Somali leaders on the sidelines of an AU summit and offered 
assistance.104 It was around this time that UN officials also started to actively encourage 
Turkish officials to engage in the country.105 Turkey was subsequently involved with 
the Djibouti Peace Process that started in 2008 and offered aid to Somalia at a donor 
conference in Brussels in 2009. In May 2010 engagement deepened substantially  
when Turkey co-hosted a conference in Istanbul together with the UN to address the  
transition crisis in Somalia. In August 2011 Turkey hosted a meeting of the Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) where US$350 million of humanitarian aid was promised  
for Somalia.
In August 2011, against this backdrop and at the height of Somalia’s famine, a 200-person 
delegation including then Prime Minister Erdoğan visited and toured Mogadishu; he  
was the first leader from outside Africa to do so in nearly two decades. The delegation  
included members of the cabinet, aid workers, businessmen, cultural envoys and 
the prime minister’s family. During this trip, significant aid commitments were 
announced as well as the establishment of direct flights from Turkey to Mogadishu  
and the re-opening of an embassy, one of the first for a non-African country in decades.  
The symbolic and high-profile visit demonstrated Turkey’s intention to expand and 
strengthen the role it plays in Somalia.
Somalia has not fallen off the list of foreign policy priorities for the Turkish government. 
In January 2015 Erdoğan, now Turkey’s president, returned to Mogadishu, and a series 
of new agreements between the Turkish and Somali governments were struck.  
Overview of 
Turkey-Somalia 
relations
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Reflecting on the efforts of both Turkish officials and citizens, President Erdoğan 
stated, “We have come this far thanks to their devoted efforts, sacrifices and service … 
Seeing that our promises are being fulfilled and results have begun to emerge further 
pleased us. The developments since our last visit give us hope for the future.”106
Several factors underpin the Turkish government’s engagement in Somalia. One is  
the belief in Turkey’s solidarity with the developing world and the moral imperative of 
assisting a country in crisis. Turkey’s policy in Somalia has been framed by its leaders 
and diplomats in such ethical terms, with its Foreign Minister stating in 2013 that  
“Turkey’s approach to the Somali crisis is one of the visible examples of Turkey’s 
human-oriented foreign policy”.107 Second, efforts to promote peace and stability 
through mediation, security sector support and aid in countries such as Somalia  
reflect the role that foreign policy makers have sought to create for Turkey. In these 
ways, Somalia is another case for Ankara to demonstrate that, concomitant with its 
rise as a global actor, it is contributing to addressing shared international challenges. 
For example, in 2011 Turkey’s prime minister dedicated half of his speech to the UN 
General Assembly to helping Somalia, stressing that “It is our greatest wish that the 
leadership demonstrated by Turkey in this direction will set an example for the entire  
international community”.108 Finally, Turkey’s engagement in Somalia should be seen in  
the context of efforts to deepen relations in Africa, which intensified in 2005. Somalia  
sits at the centre of Ankara’s Africa policy, acting as a bridge to deeper engagement 
elsewhere on the continent.109
The Turkish government’s policy towards Somalia has been defined by five key  
objectives:
 n Ending Somalia’s international isolation
 n Providing humanitarian aid
 n Rebuilding infrastructure and supporting development projects
 n Helping to restore security
 n Promoting political consensus and statebuilding as well as fostering unity110
These objectives have primarily been pursued through numerous visits of high-level  
leaders between Turkey and Somalia and sustained through their respective embassies.111 
While official exchanges have taken place with authorities in Puntland and Somali-
land, the primary focus of the diplomatic relations was initially with the Federal  
Government in Mogadishu. According to one observer, the initial Turkish position on 
Somalia was that “they did not want to be part of the process of the division of Somalia 
and did not want to be seen as encouraging a more divided and split country”.112  
In addition, Somaliland authorities were themselves slow to engage with Ankara.  
Furthermore, the political sensitivities of relations between Mogadishu, Hargeisa  
and Garowe have made a more balanced engagement challenging for Turkey.113 None-
theless, Turkish officials are well aware of the need to establish closer ties with other 
authorities and a consulate has been opened in Hargeisa.114
Official relations
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In May 2012, Turkey hosted a second conference on Somalia in Istanbul. As well as 
seeking to put Somalia on the international agenda, the event aimed to establish a 
common path beyond the TFG’s mandate. It brought together key regional and inter-
national governments, the main Somali political groupings, business leaders, delegates 
from Somaliland and over 300 civil society representatives, including 135 traditional 
elders who played a role in selecting Somalia’s post-transition political representatives. 
The Turkish Ambassador stated in a speech to Somali civil society that “[u]nlike the  
previous conferences, the Istanbul conference will not be attended only by the politicians  
but by civil society as well”.115
Though at times perceived to be acting unilaterally, Turkish officials openly recognise 
that Turkey is limited in what it alone can accomplish in Somalia.116 The roles Kenya 
and Ethiopia play in Somalia, aside from their AMISOM troop commitments, are 
acknowledged117 and engagement with the regional organisations such as the Inter-
governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU is maintained on a 
frequent basis.118 After the second Istanbul conference, Turkey joined the informal 
Somalia contact group that among others includes the EU, US and Ethiopia. Turkey 
was one of the countries that participated in the Brussels conference that endorsed  
the Somalia New Deal Compact, and that co-chair the New Deal working group on 
security with the US.
Beyond the government’s official engagement, Turkish businesses and civil society 
organisations are also active in Somalia. As with Turkish engagement elsewhere on  
the African continent, Somalia also has a commercial draw as a relatively under-
exploited and potentially profitable market for Turkish companies. Some in Turkey’s 
business community are eager to “penetrate the Somali market and play a lead role  
in reconstruction and economic development”.119 Turkish officials state that they  
have actively sought to promote commercial relations between the two countries.120 
This appears to have paid off: Turkish exports to Somalia have increased from  
US$8.5 million in 2008 to nearly US$44 million in 2012.121 The Turkish Confederation 
of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) is active in Somalia, where 
it is encouraging its members to invest and has created the Somali-Turkish Business 
Association. A small number of Turkish companies have been involved in the  
construction sector for several years.122 Turkish company Favori received in September 
2013 a government contract to manage Mogadishu’s airport, which has been renovated 
by Kozuva, another Turkish company.123 Another Turkish venture, Al Bayrak, has 
been offered a 20-year contract for the management of its main sea port – though the 
former has been held up by political opposition to the deal.124 UK-Turkish firm Genel 
Energy started exploring for oil in Somaliland in 2012 but pulled out after 18 months, 
reportedly due to security concerns.125
One major Turkish civil society organisation, the Human Rights Foundation (IHH),  
has been working in the country since 1997. Turkish charities played a significant role in  
creating popular awareness in Turkey of Somalia’s 2011 famine, mobilising celebrities 
and the media while collecting donations from the public and leading the charge to 
engage. According to one Turkish analyst, in many ways “the Turkish state was trying 
Non-state actors 
and the multi-track 
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to catch up with civil society”.126 Indeed, while foreign policy issues receive relatively 
little public attention within Turkey, its government has also sought to respond to the 
views of the electorate and the campaigns of civil society. It was during the Ramadan  
period, when public awareness and civil society mobilisation around the Somali famine  
was at its peak in Turkey, that Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Somalia.
Turkish NGOs are often quite independent; however, they have sought to coordinate  
efforts with the government. On the other hand, the Turkish officials seek to present  
the role of non-state actors as part of a well-coordinated national effort that draws on  
Turkey’s civilian capacity and is illustrative of the multi-track approach to humanitarian  
diplomacy.127 While a multi-track approach can be an important asset for combining 
humanitarian interventions with a wider peacebuilding and conflict transformation 
agenda, the realities of the coordination between the Turkish state and a wide range of 
NGOs are explored more critically below. Nevertheless, many Somali officials and civil 
society actors perceive Turkey’s government, NGOs and businesses as components  
of a wider Turkish package, even if this approach might need further refining and 
modification to benefit the conflict transformation and reconstruction in Somalia.
The visible presence of Turkish actors on the ground in Mogadishu has reinforced 
positive views of Turkey among many in Somalia. Through the actions of a range of 
Turkish state and non-state actors, Turkey has developed significant soft power. At 
the same time, the very identity of Turkey arguably makes such engagement much 
easier. Cultural proximity can be a comparative advantage in some circumstances, and 
Somali and Turkish actors frequently point to religion, empathy and closeness to com-
munity as an advantage for Turkey. The perception of Turkey as a democratic county 
with high rates of development has also contributed to Somalis’ positive feelings about 
Turkey’s role in the country. Turkey is broadly perceived to be distinct from groupings 
of Western states that have traditionally been engaged in Somalia with limited results. 
In these ways, according to one analyst, it “is seen as a country to emulate rather than 
an external power to be feared”.128
Turkish nationals and aid projects have been caught up in Somalia’s conflict dynamics. 
Al-Shabaab has attacked Turkish aid convoys and, in October 2011, detonated a bomb  
killing 70 people, many of them waiting to collect the results of scholarship examinations  
as part of a Turkish aid programme.129 Turkish officials were directly targeted in a car 
bombing in July 2013. Following this attack, an al-Shabaab spokesman argued that the 
“Turkish are part of a group of nations bolstering the apostate regime and attempting 
to suppress the establishment of Islamic Sharia”.130 In January 2015 al-Shabaab claimed 
responsibility for a car bomb targeting a hotel where Turkish officials were preparing 
for President Erdoğan’s imminent second trip to Mogadishu.131
While cognisant of the importance of wider conflict dynamics in Somalia, Turkish  
officials see al-Shabaab as the most important threat to the country’s overall stability. 
One argues that without its presence, Somalia would likely return to much higher levels 
of peace and be able to overcome clan politics: “If we get rid of the terrorism then it 
becomes a normal democratic country and people will work through this ideological 
way.”132
Engagement on peace 
and security
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In general, Turkish actors engaged in Somalia are sceptical of international and regional 
interventions that rely on military tools and ignore the complex social and political 
relations between al-Shabaab and civilians.133 Turkish diplomats state that the Somali 
national security forces must be improved to counter the threat of al-Shabaab and 
to reduce the country’s dependence on troops from neighbouring countries, which 
is seen as a source of provocation for al-Shabaab fighters and supporters.134 As such, 
while Turkey’s government has provided some funds for AMISOM,135 it has prioritised 
its support for Somalia’s own military and police forces.136 Turkey’s 2010 bilateral treaty 
with Somalia includes military cooperation and, in 2011, it provided US$300,000 for 
a UN-managed fund for transitional security institutions.137 In August 2012, Turkey 
announced the creation of a US$5 million trust fund for security sector reform and, 
just days after new President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed’s inauguration, a military  
delegation was sent to Turkey to discuss the rebuilding of the army, with a new agree-
ment signed in February 2014.138 Somali police have also been trained in Turkey on a  
regular basis since 2012 and there are plans for this training to take place in Mogadishu.139
Turkey’s support for Somalia’s security sector has not been without controversy.  
AMISOM has played a key role in the implementation of Somalia’s security sector 
reform programme and “AU officials consider Turkey’s training of Somali police as a 
duplication”.140 The SEMG has sought more information from Turkey on its support 
for the security sector and raised concerns over adherence to the reporting require-
ments of the arms embargo in force on Somalia and Eritrea.141 One of the greatest risks 
regarding the diversion of assistance to Somalia from other donors has historically 
related to security assistance, with weapons, vehicles, and equipment given to support 
security provision repeatedly falling into the hands of militias, and soldiers trained by 
international actors repeatedly defecting to various factions, and thus directly feeding 
into ongoing violence.142
Turkish officials believe that a military approach to al-Shabaab must be accompanied 
by constructive dialogue with the group’s members.143 While promoting conflict  
resolution is a substantial part of Turkish diplomatic engagement in Somalia, the 
extent to which the government has directly engaged on mediation with al-Shabaab is  
unclear.144 Following the armed opposition group Hizbul Islam’s announcement of a  
split from al-Shabaab in September 2012, and its openness to talks with the government,  
one Somali report stated that Turkey had played an important role.145 Turkish diplomats  
admit that efforts have been made to engage with al-Shabaab and there have been  
reports that it sought at one point to establish lines of communication between militant  
groups and the TFG.146 Nonetheless, it appears that these ambitions have not met with 
great success. Turkish efforts to mediate have not only involved its government: a 
Turkish NGO also attempted to mediate independently between al-Shabaab forces  
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and local communities outside of Mogadishu in 2011, but the TFG stopped the process 
and banned the NGO from working on the issue.147
The main focus of the Turkish government’s mediation efforts has been on facilitating  
talks between the Federal Government and authorities from Somaliland.148 While 
some in Hargeisa perceive that Ankara has a bias towards Mogadishu and is pushing  
a unification agenda, senior leaders from Somaliland involved in the talks believe that 
it is neutral.149 For their part, Turkish diplomats stress that their only aim is to support  
reconciliation and confidence building between the two political authorities.150  
Several rounds of talks have been held in Turkey and a secretariat has been established 
in Istanbul. However, and despite positive statements and agreements made between 
both parties, tangible outcomes have so far been few and far between.
Turkish officials have stated their intention to encourage constructive dialogue within 
South-Central Somalia, between the Federal Government and emerging regional  
administrations. The strengthening of relations between these areas is seen as a priority  
by the Turkish government for the peace and cohesion of the country.151
As is the case with many of Somalia’s donors, it is also argued by Turkish diplomats 
that the Federal Government must be able to provide alternative social services into  
areas where al-Shabaab previously had control. It is believed that extending its authority  
beyond Mogadishu in this regard will be vital to building the state’s legitimacy and filling 
the vacuum created by al-Shabaab’s absence.152 Final agreement and implementation  
of the constitution and a federal structure of governance is seen as an important priority  
in this regard.153 Finally, Turkish diplomats have on several occasions emphasised that 
national reconciliation will be required for the country to move forward.154
The 2011 Somalia famine was an unprecedented moment in Turkish aid history,  
representing a mobilisation of public donations and coordination of activities between 
civil society and the state that had not been seen before. Private sector donations from 
Turkey in 2011 reportedly amounted to US$57 million while the state donated US$94 
million, making Somalia its fourth largest aid recipient that year.155 Around 500  
Turkish aid workers and volunteers poured into the Mogadishu from August 2011 to 
deliver humanitarian aid that included provision of water, food and non-food items  
in IDP camps.156
Aid to Somalia has by no means been a one-off response to a single crisis: in 2012,  
it was the second largest recipient of emergency aid and the fifth largest recipient of 
overall official aid, valued at US$86.6 million.157 This rose to US$116 million in 2013, 
making Somalia the fourth largest recipient again.158 In 2012 it remained the number 
one destination of TIKA’s own internal budget, accounting for 30.5 per cent of the 
Official aid
Turkey’s aid 
to Somalia
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agency’s total spending.159 In 2013, however, Somalia received 10.7 per cent of TIKA’s 
aid, a smaller proportion than that allocated to Palestine and Tunisia.160
Working under the auspices of the Turkish embassy, TIKA is the key implementing  
body for official assistance to Somalia. Originally focused on the delivery and  
coordination of humanitarian aid, TIKA has gradually diverted its focus to sustainable  
development projects as the famine started to ease. In 2012, the majority of TIKA’s 
budget was allocated to water and sanitation (44 per cent), economic infrastructure  
(16 per cent), education (15 per cent), health (13 per cent), and government and civil 
institutions (seven per cent).161 This allocation changed in 2014, with economic infra- 
structure taking the lion’s share (70 per cent), followed by health (24 per cent) and  
government and civil institutions (four per cent).162 
TIKA has identified its priorities in Somalia in multiple ways, including through 
scoping missions, direct consultation with the Federal Government and other Somali 
actors, and its engagement in multilateral forums. A key input, which continues to 
guide TIKA policy today, is a list of potential development projects identified by a  
delegation of government experts sent to Mogadishu in 2011.163 New project proposals  
received directly from the Somalia Federal Government are sent to TIKA’s head- 
quarters for authorisation together with a feasibility assessment. The TIKA office in 
Somalia has significant influence in programme funding decisions and mode of  
implementation.
Projects are mostly implemented in partnership with Somalia’s Federal Government 
ministries or local authorities and, in some cases, with Somali NGOs. Public-private 
partnership is also sought, with TIKA sub-contracting some of the programme  
implementation to both Turkish and Somali companies. TIKA uses fast-track tender 
processes in Somalia. It also carries out monitoring and evaluation of its aid projects,  
although it is not clear whether external and independent project evaluation constitutes 
part of the project cycle.
TIKA has the mandate to coordinate all the aid flows coming from other Turkish  
public agencies. The most prominent in Somalia are the ministries of education and 
health and Turkey’s religious, water, airports and housing agencies. Nearly all official 
humanitarian aid is delivered through Kizilay (see below).
To date, Turkey’s official aid projects have been implemented largely in Mogadishu, 
with little if any of the funding provided to the Federal Government passed on to 
the regions beyond its administrative control. With the opening of TIKA offices in 
Hargeisa in 2014, and potentially also in Garowe, Turkey’s aid distribution is expected 
to change. Turkish officials have also expressed intentions to open offices in Baidoa 
and Kismayo, subject to the security situation.
Although it is not clearly spelled out in publicly available policy papers, Turkey claims 
that its approach represents a unique model of aid delivery in Somalia. In the words  
of the last Turkish Ambassador to Somalia, Kani Torun, “our aim is to show a  
different model can work in getting help to the people.”164 Turkey perceives the over- 
bureaucratisation of some of the traditional aid delivery systems as a hindrance to its  
effectiveness. However, while the simplification of processes is desirable in the sector,  
it would appear that Turkey is using simplification interchangeably with ad-hoc 
interventions, with some officials admitting that Turkish aid actors are more willing 
to act first and then organise processes afterwards.165 This raises further questions as 
to whether aid delivery is guided by a coherent model. Nonetheless, Turkish officials 
 saferworld and istanbul policy center  25 
 166  Interview, Istanbul, 25 February 2014.
 167  Cited in Daily Nation (2012) ‘Why Turkish aid model is proving to be a success in Somalia and elsewhere’ in Daily Nation  
1 April 2012.
 168  Op cit. Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2014).
 169  Op cit. TIKA (2013), p 77.
 170  Op cit. Murphy & Woods (2014). 
 171  For example, during the period he served as prime minister in the Federal Government, close relations were established with 
the current president of Puntland, who came to power in January 2014. Officials argue that these close relations mean that 
Turkey is now in a position to deliver aid projects in the region. Interview, Istanbul, 25 February 2014.
 172  For example, Turkey’s Foreign Minister argued at the 2013 London conference that “from now on Somalis should be in  
the driving seat of all future endeavours concerning Somalia”. Cited in Turkish Foreign Ministry (2013), Statement by  
Mr. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the Somalia Conference, 7 May 2013, London, www.mfa.gov.
tr/statement-by-mr_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-at-the-somalia-conference_-7-may-2013_-
london.en.mfa. Also see Turkish Foreign Ministry (2012), The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, Final Declaration, 
1 June 2012, Istanbul, www.mfa.gov.tr/the-second-istanbul--conference-on-somalia_-final-declaration_-1-june-2012_-
istanbul.en.mfa
identify what they believe to be several defining characteristics of Turkey’s approach  
to aid delivery in Somalia.
One perception among Turkish officials is that Turkey has been more willing than 
other donors to invest aid in development projects alongside humanitarian responses 
and despite ongoing instability. In the words of one, the “West is waiting for Somalia  
to be stable to invest in. But Turkey is investing in stability.”166 Aid for the development  
of physical infrastructure is considered to be a high priority. Turkey’s ambassador 
has suggested that “without it, there can be no development in the country.”167 One 
of TIKA’s largest development projects – and one of the few to be implemented in 
Somaliland as well as in Puntland and South-Central Somalia – has been focused on 
water infrastructure. Turkish aid has also supported repaving roads and renovating 
the airport in Mogadishu. Health has been a significant focus area of development aid. 
US$35 million has been spent on the renovation of Digfeer hospital in Mogadishu, now 
named the Somalia-Turkey Training and Research Hospital. The Turkish government 
has also paid for the running of two field hospitals in the city staffed with Turkish  
doctors. In 2015, Turkey committed to building 10,000 houses for low-income groups 
in Mogadishu.168 In addition to physical infrastructure, Turkish aid has also supported 
social infrastructure development, for example in the education sector through  
scholarships to study at Turkish universities, with 440 places offered in 2012, and small 
amounts of aid provided to universities and schools within Mogadishu.169 Capacity 
building initiatives have also been supported through agricultural or fishing training 
centres.
Another characteristic of Turkish official aid that is similar to some other emerging 
donors is the preference for engaging in direct bilateral aid practices rather than  
supporting multilateral bodies to implement projects or deliver its aid. Turkish officials 
argue that this is a considerably faster and more effective way to deliver aid. Addition-
ally, they suggest that the approach encourages greater transparency and trust between 
Somali leaders and Turkish actors.170 Indeed close interpersonal relations with key 
government officials are understood to play a central role in Turkey’s approach.171
A third characteristic identified by Turkish officials is that, also similar to other  
emerging donors, Turkey seeks to challenge approaches that circumvent the role,  
ownership and active involvement of the central state in development management. 
Consistent with the principles of the Somali Compact and the approach of other 
donors, the empowerment of Somalia’s leadership in directing the development of 
their country is perceived as a key means for furthering the principle of national 
ownership.172 National ownership is promoted through promoting the role of Somali 
authorities in managing aid flows, building horizontal partnerships with the Federal 
Government and/or relevant local authorities that are based on consultation, and 
ensuring approval of programmes by the Somali authorities before implementation.
Statebuilding, largely understood as the improvement and expansion of the operations 
of the state, whether at federal or local level, is also seen by officials as a central com-
ponent of Turkey’s approach in Somalia. It is understood to have a ‘multidimensional’ 
impact, connected to Turkey’s approach to ownership and engagement. Building the 
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capacity of the state to deliver services, especially in the health and education sectors, 
is seen as crucial to delivering development to Somali citizens. This in turn is seen as 
strengthening the legitimacy of the state. Finally, statebuilding is seen as a means to 
make Somalia self-sufficient.173
Support for statebuilding is provided through training for Somali officials. For example, 
the Turkish MFA has trained Somali diplomats, while courses on urban policy have 
been delivered to officials from local municipalities in Somalia. Some 52 Turkish  
doctors and managers working at the Somalia-Turkey Training and Research Hospital 
will train their Somali counterparts and turn the hospital over to full Somali control 
within five years. In 2012, the Turkish Ambassador also announced that Turkey would 
support improved financial management through support for a revenue authority,  
tax regulation authorities and a financial auditing system – though these have yet to  
be implemented.174 It is unclear how many experts the Turkish government has sent  
to support the capacity of the Federal Government. Officials recognise that insecurity 
in Mogadishu has been a challenge for their deployment.175
Another form of support has been through financial support. For example, Turkey’s 
government has committed US$85.6 million for the operating costs of the Somalia-
Turkey Training and Research Hospital over the next five years.176 Turkey has also  
provided direct budget support. Between June and December 2013, the Turkish  
government provided the Somali Central Bank with US$4.5 million in cash every 
month. According to Turkish officials, this was provided to meet a critical shortfall  
in funding for salaries of Somali public servants and security forces.177 In response  
to media reports in February 2014 suggesting otherwise, the Turkish government  
confirmed that it would continue to provide cash aid to the Federal Government.178 
Withholding investment in Somalia’s state until sufficient levels of checks and balances 
are established within the governance system is seen as an impediment to the state- 
building project by Turkish authorities, who take the view that external financial support  
can help create the institutional mechanisms necessary to manage corruption.179
In line with moves in this direction by a range of traditional and emerging donors, 
Turkey’s approach to development in Somalia aims to complement its economic  
interests for the mutual benefit of both countries. As such, the promotion of Turkish 
investment and businesses in Somalia is seen to complement aid.180 As one Turkish 
diplomat argues, “the best aid is trade”.181 In these ways, officials see the role of business 
actors as being part of the government’s unique multi-track approach to Somalia.
Turkish NGOs are also seen as a central component of the country’s multi-track 
approach.182 Many of those working for NGOs share this sentiment, arguing that their 
role is perceived by Somalis as part of a wider package of Turkish assistance to the 
country. Although frequently pointed to as a major challenge for Turkish aid actors, 
government agencies and civil society actors have at times coordinated aid among 
them.183 This coordination was at its zenith in 2011 in response to the humanitarian 
emergency, and there have subsequently been a number of joint development projects 
between Turkish official agencies and NGOs.184
Turkish NGOs
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A wide variety of NGOs are present in Somalia. Kizilay, which is part of the International 
Red Cross-Red Crescent Movement, and is considered non-governmental like its 
counterparts elsewhere, is a major Turkish aid actor in Somalia, receiving some US$60 
million from the government in 2011 for delivery of emergency assistance.185 While it 
was fifth for the Turkish government, Somalia was the largest global recipient of aid 
from Turkish NGOs in 2012, with US$26.41 million provided.186 This figure increased 
to US$36.1 million in 2013.187 The most active NGOs in Somalia are IHH, Deniz Feneri, 
Yardim Eli (Helping Hands), Yeryüzü Doktorları (Doctors Worldwide) and Kimse Yok 
Mu (‘Is Anybody There?’), one of Turkey’s largest NGOs. Smaller aid associations, such 
as the Aegean International Health Federation (ESAFED), are also active in Somalia.
Turkish NGOs focus aid on a range of sectors. As noted, Kizilay is active in the delivery 
of humanitarian aid, running the Jazira IDP camp in Mogadishu and delivering a 
wide range of services to the approximately 12,000 inhabitants of the camp in 2011 and 
2012.188 During the famine period Turkish NGOs provided a significant amount of the 
aid in the Jazira camp, though they also worked in other IDP camps in Mogadishu.
Turkish NGOs are active in the health sector. Some of this has been focused on infra-
structure, with three hospitals being built in Mogadishu by private NGOs. They have 
also supported numerous training initiatives for Somali health workers in Turkey, 
sometimes in partnership with official Turkish agencies. Health services, such as  
cataract operations or health clinics, have been provided directly to Somali beneficiaries. 
A wide range of Turkish NGOs have implemented projects in the education sector.  
For example, Kimse Yok Mu has earmarked roughly US$7 million for Somali students  
to study in Turkey until 2022 while in 2013 IHH opened one of Somalia’s biggest 
schools in Mogadishu.189 The Nile Foundation runs three schools in Mogadishu and 
one in Hargeisa. A number of Turkish NGOs also provide vocational training, with 
IHH for example supporting an agriculture course.
Turkish NGOs have supported infrastructure projects in addition to the construction  
of schools and hospitals. For example, Kizilay, in partnership with the Istanbul  
Metropolitan Municipality, has established a concrete plant in Mogadishu to support 
road construction. A number of Turkish NGOs are involved in the provision of water 
infrastructure. For example, Kimse Yok Mu spent an estimated US$2 million on water 
wells in 2013.190 IHH is currently building 96 wells in the country and plans to open an 
irrigation channel in the South-Central region to help farmers.191
Turkish NGOs also distribute charitable donations. For example, Yardim Eli sponsors 
some Somali families with US$100 dollars a month.192 Significant donations are made 
during Ramadan and Eid. For example, Kimse Yok Mu states that it has given roughly 
US$3.7 million worth of donations for the Eid festivals from 2011 to 2013.193
Given the significant variation in their size, histories and mandates, it is difficult to 
define clear commonalities in approaches to the delivery of aid by Turkish NGOs. 
Nonetheless, several factors are worth noting.
One is the fact that, like Turkish official aid, the majority of assistance from Turkish 
NGOs has been delivered in Mogadishu. Another is that many Turkish NGOs have 
adopted what they call a ‘direct aid’ approach, meaning that it is Turkish aid agencies, 
manned by Turkish staff, who directly oversee the management of aid distribution 
on the ground, from its arrival in Somalia to its delivery to final beneficiaries. Even 
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though some other international NGOs deliver aid directly or have done in the past, 
notably in the 1980s and 1990s, many Turkish aid workers believe that this approach  
makes them distinct from others. It is seen as a means of ensuring that their aid reaches  
beneficiaries. For example, reflecting on their response to the famine, one Turkish 
NGO worker notes that “all our workers were Turkish. We did this to control our own 
aid and budget”.194 A notable aspect of the direct aid approach is the reliance of several 
Turkish NGOs on rotations of Turkish volunteers, who are coordinated by one or two 
permanent professional staff on the ground.195
On the whole, the direct aid approach has in the past precluded delivering aid through 
local NGOs. However, this is not uniform; as with the NGO sector across the globe, 
modalities vary. At least one large NGO, IHH, has no permanent office in Somalia;  
its one to two permanent staff work through a Somali partner organisation, Zamzam. 
Moreover, other NGOs have worked with local partners to deliver relief aid to areas 
which are not accessible by foreign organisations and, in ad-hoc cases, local partners 
have been used to implement projects in areas where Turkish NGOs do not have a  
permanent presence, including in Puntland and Somaliland.
As the security situation continues to be highly volatile and the number of attacks 
against Turkish projects and aid workers has increased, the number of Turkish  
organisations working through local partners has increased and they also increasingly 
rely on national staff members to implement programmes. With this, the capacity 
building for national organisations has been included into activities. Trainings and 
skills transfer through partnerships for both state and non-state actors has started to 
be highlighted by NGOs as a contribution to ending aid dependency and promoting 
sustainable development.
Turkish NGOs stress that they adhere to humanitarian principles, namely impartiality, 
independence and humanity, in the delivery of humanitarian aid. While variation 
exists between NGOs, many seek to work through or alongside Somali government 
authorities in the design and delivery of development projects. For example, one 
explained that when his NGO first arrived in Somalia in 2011, “we connected with  
the President of Somalia first, he told us who to engage with”, leading to a relationship  
with figures in the Ministry of Health who advised them on the location of projects.196  
Others have had similar experiences and, at the very least, most NGOs appear to seek 
official Federal Government support for their projects from relevant ministries.
Different approaches exist to the identification and assessment of potential aid projects.  
For example, Kizilay sent an assessment team to Somalia shortly before launching its 
response to the 2011 famine, where it consulted with the Somali Red Crescent Society,  
while Kimse Yok Mu draws on a network of Turkish volunteers in the country, usually  
linked to faith-based schools, to inform decision making on where aid should be 
delivered. Monitoring and evaluation of the impact of aid projects also varies between 
organisations.
Aside from Kizilay, most NGOs are largely dependent on public donations in Turkey, 
exemplified by the large public campaign on Somalia’s famine launched by civil society 
in 2011. Public fundraising is often done for earmarked projects, reducing the flexibility  
to respond to changing needs. Turkish NGOs have also indicated that as attention has 
turned to Syria, public donations for Somalia have started to decrease.
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Risks and  
opportunities ahead
turkey’s aid has been enthusiastically received by many Somalis. Distinct 
from Somalia’s traditional donors, the image of Turkey – as an emerging economy with 
historic and cultural links to the country – partially explains this. Somalis frequently 
affirm this while Turkish aid workers also suggest that their cultural proximity has 
helped in connecting with local communities. Nonetheless Somali stakeholders stress 
that the ‘how’ matters just as much as the ‘who’ in explaining the popularity of Turkish  
aid. Several commonly-held perspectives on why Turkish aid has been popular are 
worth noting.
The humanitarian response to the 2011 famine by Turkish aid agencies has attracted 
considerable praise. For example, one Somali working for an international aid agency 
argues, rightly or wrongly, “while the response was mainly in Mogadishu, when it 
comes to reach and saving lives [Kizilay] were effective. No other agency provided as 
much.”197 The director of the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) has stated that Turkish NGOs “are providing the best service in the best way 
possible. The Turkish-run camps are the ones with the highest standards”.198 Pointing 
to the lives saved, one Somali politician suggests that “generation after generation will 
remember what Turkey has done”.199
There appears to be an appetite among many Somalis for the type of development  
projects that Turkey has supported, especially with regard to physical infrastructure. 
For example, one civil society activist argues that “traditional donors can learn from 
Turkey about providing aid that is tangible and practical, aid that a common person 
can see”.200 The relative scale of this type of assistance, and that it is delivered despite 
ongoing insecurity, is also a common topic for praise. Reflecting on aid from other 
donors, which he described as slow and bureaucratic, one Somali researcher adds  
that aid from Turkey is “quick, relevant and impactful”.201 As with its humanitarian 
assistance, Somali stakeholders often stress that Turkish development projects are  
of high quality, for example singling out Turkish schools for praise.202
While hard to corroborate, one local official in Mogadishu estimates that Turkish  
projects have already created 2,000 skilled and unskilled jobs through building 
A warm 
response
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schools, hospitals, constructing roads and rubbish collection.203 However, some still 
believe that “they don’t hire as much as they could, they bring their own people from 
the cleaner to the engineer”.204 In addition, one researcher argued, “direct aid also risks 
undermining government legitimacy, which needs to be built for long-term stability. 
As such it needs to be the Somali government that is seen to be delivering develop-
ment, not outsiders.”205 While other factors certainly play a role, including security, 
these are both reasons why other donors have tended to move away from the direct 
delivery of their aid and instead direct it through Somali actors.206
Nonetheless, the direct delivery model employed by Turkish aid providers is consist-
ently highlighted as a reason for their effectiveness by Somali stakeholders. Somalia’s 
ambassador to Turkey suggests that “Somalis perceive Turks different than any other 
nation, as we refer to Turks as our brothers. The major reason behind this is due to  
Turkey implementing aid directly to Mogadishu.”207 Pointing to Turkey’s rehabilitation  
of the Digfeer hospital in Mogadishu, one Somali observer argues that “if this hospital  
works and is managed by Turkey for five years it will be the best hospital in East 
Africa”.208 Numerous stakeholders interviewed for this study believed that a larger 
proportion of Turkish aid was likely to reach its intended beneficiaries because Turkish 
agencies were on the ground administering its delivery.
Turkish officials further argue that the presence and visibility of Turkish aid workers  
on the ground in Mogadishu during the response to the famine contributed to the 
emergence of greater hope and optimism in Somalia.209 One aid worker, based in 
Nairobi, admits that “a Turkish doctor cycling down a Turkish-built road to work in 
a Turkish clinic was welcomed by Somalis because it was hugely important for hope. 
Somalis don’t need people hiding.”210 Even though relative improvements in security 
were likely a key factor, some believe that the decision of officials and aid workers from 
other countries to relocate from Nairobi to Mogadishu was influenced by Turkey’s 
example.211
Ahead of President Erdoğan’s second visit to Mogadishu in January 2015, his counter-
part, President Hassan, summarised the official response to Turkey’s aid:
“Turkey has shown the way in developing a holistic, on-the-ground partnership with 
Somalia that has supported us in growing according to a nationally-led and owned  
agenda … Turkey did not hold back, waiting for stability before it invested. Instead, it  
invested to achieve it. Where other international partners chose to plan their interventions  
from elsewhere, Turkey put its people on the ground in Somalia to maximise the efficient 
use of their human and planning resources in support of their financial resources. Turkish 
aid workers delivered their aid directly to the beneficiaries, to maximise impact.” 212
Alongside perceived improvements in security in 2011 and the election of a new  
government in 2012, Turkey’s engagement in Somalia was part of a changed inter-
national narrative on the country’s future. Glowing media reports, visiting foreign  
dignitaries, international conferences and packed flights to Mogadishu all suggested  
Somalia was turning a corner. The reality is, sadly, significantly less rosy. With continued  
violence and political instability continuing to undermine the emergence of the state, 
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the corner has not yet been turned. Long-term observers of Somalia are quick to point 
out that past periods of similar optimism have been punctuated by cycles of violence 
and instability.213
Over the past 20 years, many international actors have invested significant effort and 
resources into delivering humanitarian relief and trying to support development and 
stability in Somalia. But, against this background, others assert that Turkey’s approach 
is pioneering, and speak “of pragmatism, of hope, of a country that dares to aim for 
development before the outcome of the political unrest is settled”.214
It is possibly too early to validate many of the positive claims about Turkish aid or 
accurately judge how it has shaped Somalia. It is beyond the scope of this research 
report to assess the impact of individual aid projects or to make a broader judgement 
on the humanitarian and development impact from Turkish aid as a whole, especially 
given the differences between the multiple state and non-state actors involved. None-
theless, it is possible to highlight some risks that have arisen in the Somalia context as 
well recommendations on opportunities for Turkish policymakers, officials and civil 
society involved in the distribution of aid to ensure it promotes peace.
The provision of aid is affected by conflict dynamics. In the case of Turkey, this has 
been illustrated in multiple ways. In 2012 militiamen fired on a crowd in an apparent 
attempt to control IDPs receiving aid from Kizilay.215 In another incident in 2012,  
TFG forces and district clan militias clashed in Mogadishu over a dispute related to  
a Turkish aid consignment.216 In other cases, al-Shabaab has directly targeted Turkish 
actors and aid projects, arguing that Turkey’s support for the government makes it a 
legitimate target.
It is clear then that Turkey’s aid is bound up with and affected by Somalia’s conflict 
dynamics. Indeed, the provision of aid is not only affected by conflict dynamics, but 
aid can itself impact on these dynamics, for better or for worse. All aid actors operate 
within the political economy of conflict in Somalia, rather than being detached from 
it, and Turkey is no different. With this in mind, several risks can be identified, some of 
which are common to all aid actors, some of which apply more specifically to Turkey.
One of the major initial challenges for aid agencies from Turkey was their limited 
knowledge and experience of Somalia’s conflict dynamics, a fact that is acknowledged 
by Turkish officials and NGO workers.217 Many first became involved in Somalia as 
part of the large-scale response to the 2011 famine. One Somali working for an inter-
national NGO notes, “They did not consider a lot of things. For them it was just to 
reach people and support them.”218 One Turkish NGO worker reflects that “we were 
not experienced enough in both our humanitarian and development aid; we did not 
have a strategy and we did not do good evaluations.”219 A rush to provide assistance 
combined with a weak understanding Somalia’s conflict may have increased the risks 
of aid further fuelling the conflict.
Limited knowledge of 
conflict dynamics
Risks that aid 
drives conflict
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There are indications that in certain instances Turkish aid has been diverted into the 
war economy. In some cases it has simply been looted, as was the case in September 
2012 when al-Shabaab looted several trucks containing Turkish food aid.220 Diversion 
has occurred in other ways too. For example, one Turkish aid worker described how 
his agency discovered that flour they were distributing was being immediately sold on 
the market.221 Focus group discussants in Mogadishu claimed that in some instances 
when Turkish agencies used Somali contractors, aid was diverted.222 As one Somali 
NGO worker noted, “During the last two years, business people intervened in the 
[Turkish] aid for their own interests. They have tried to divert Turkish aid assistance  
to the market before it reaches beneficiaries.”223
Turkish aid workers also recount the immense logistical challenges experienced by all  
aid agencies when operating in IDP camps, where numbers often exceeded expectations 
and the absence of identification cards made preventing the diversion of aid extremely 
difficult.224 The SEMG observed in 2012 that gatekeepers in charge of IDP camps 
purposefully destroyed makeshift shelters in order to obtain new tents from Turkish 
NGOs. These tents were then “often given or sold to members of the community close 
to the district officials, not to the IDPs … When tents were in fact delivered to IDPs, 
the occupants were monitored to ensure they kept the tents in good condition for 
eventual resale.”225 Indeed, as with other donors rushing into Mogadishu, IDP camps 
became assets that were controlled by militias and gatekeepers to attract Turkish aid.
In some cases, Turkish NGOs’ access to IDP camps required the permission of local 
authorities who were understood to have important clan ties by aid workers.226 While  
Turkish NGOs state that they did not directly pay for access, they did in some cases have  
to employ individuals suggested by local authorities in order to develop relations.227 
Although it is not known how widespread this practice is, in circumstances where 
local authorities do not always coordinate services according to needs, such incidents 
potentially entrench the local power relations which emerge from but also sustain  
conflict dynamics.
This is also illustrated by Turkish humanitarian agencies who, like many other inter-
national NGOs, have on occasion had to engage with al-Shabaab or other conflict 
actors beyond Mogadishu in order to get humanitarian access to areas of South-
Central Somalia.228 While it may be justified for humanitarian purposes, through such 
practices all aid agencies, including those from Turkey, risk increasing the power and 
legitimacy of conflict actors, and being manipulated for military or strategic purposes.
One criticism levelled at Turkish aid agencies is that many have become too closely 
associated with a specific political elite within the top echelons of the Federal Govern-
ment.229 It is difficult to substantiate the variety of perspectives about the relationships 
between Turkish aid actors and different actors within the government. Furthermore, 
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opinions over who should and should not have authority over Turkish aid projects are 
obviously highly politicised. Nonetheless, it is clear that Turkish officials have sought 
to develop personalised relations with key government figures who have played a role 
in shaping Turkey’s official aid. This was the case for instance with the 2011 delegation 
of experts to identify potential development projects, which was coordinated with the 
Office of the President.230 As noted, Turkish NGOs have also engaged closely with  
government authorities in order decide on the allocation of their aid.
Engagement with Federal Government officials is of course not unique to Turkish aid 
agencies, especially with the advent of the New Deal. In many regards it is necessary, 
for example in the conduct of needs assessments. With regard to development aid, 
there is also an argument for engaging with the government in order to promote its 
ownership of aid and to support statebuilding processes.
However, while by no means always the case, political leaders and officials in Somalia  
are often perceived to represent factional clan interests rather than the country’s citizens  
as a whole.231 The risk is that the benefits of aid are directed to specific individuals and  
groups for political or economic benefit. Turkish aid workers have come to acknowledge 
this problem, with one noting that “the Federal Government itself always tries to direct 
you in non-neutral ways”.232 Perceptions of the capture of aid by particular interests can 
feed into grievances about corruption and the unfairness and exclusion it entails.
Indeed a further risk is that by affording Mogadishu’s political actors significant  
influence over how the benefits of aid are delivered, Turkish donors risk empowering  
them at a perceived cost to others, thus inadvertently altering power relations and 
affecting conflict dynamics.233 For political actors, having authority over Turkish aid 
reportedly “bolsters their relevance and influence”.234 For example, it has been reported 
that Somali officials in the Education Ministry became increasingly influential as a 
result of the Turkish government’s flagship scholarship programme.235
These risks do not mean that aid cannot be coordinated with or through the state or 
that seeking to support statebuilding and national ownership of development efforts 
should be abandoned. Rather, the point is that the risks need to be acknowledged and 
managed in partnership with Somali stakeholders.
An additional risk is that the reliance of Turkish officials on personal relationships 
risks undermining institutional development. For example, one Somali politician 
complains that the Turkish government “directly contacts the President, the Speaker 
and the Prime Minister. They ignore government institutions.”236 While Turkish aid 
actors perceive direct engagement as the most effective way to get things done in the  
absence of institutionalised structures within the Federal Government, being perceived  
to bypass institutions potentially risks exacerbating the very problem of weak institu-
tional capacity the Turkish government states it is trying to fix.
As noted, Turkish officials are aware of the challenges posed by corruption but argue 
that directly supporting state authorities and pursuing consistent but incremental 
reform while building capacities to prevent corruption is a more effective approach 
than refusing to deal with authorities at all.237 This is not a risk-free strategy. Although 
not substantiated, one Federal Government politician claims that some “Somali  
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politicians misled Turkish aid officials by naming relatives to support [the] Turkish 
for their interests … We know young individuals enriched by the Turkish aid manage-
ment!”238 One Turkish NGO worker paints a similarly bleak picture of his experience:
“So one minister comes and asks you to distribute to their clan … So you need some  
services and you need to buy some local services, and another minister comes and asks 
you to buy the services from his company. So every single minister and every single  
politician or MP has their own business in Somalia.” 239
There have also been allegations of corruption within specific Turkish aid projects, 
such as the Turkey’s high-profile scholarship programme. According to one Somali 
civil society activist, “The distribution of the scholarships and the running of the 
examinations by the Turks was good, they went everywhere and the process was fair. 
The problem was later on.”240 Somali officials managed the final allocation of places. 
Although unsubstantiated, the names of successful candidates were allegedly in some 
cases removed, with others travelling to Turkey instead.241
Providing direct budget support to the Federal Government presents as great a risk 
of corruption for Turkey as for any other international donor. There is no doubt that 
Turkey is more open about its direct aid to the Somali government than some other 
countries and that some Somalis see it as demonstrative of a tangible, efficient and 
quick form of support.242 However, it is unclear as to how Turkey’s aid is accounted 
for. As noted, the SEMG has highlighted the misuse of government funds in Somalia, 
including from its central bank. Some in civil society welcome Turkey’s intention but 
are concerned that “the government itself is not accountable. Nobody knows where  
the US$4.5 million goes.”243
As noted in Section Two, the tendency towards the concentration of international aid 
to Mogadishu is a highly contentious issue tied up with the wider dynamics of this 
conflict. There is a perception that Turkish aid actors do not understand these regional 
dynamics. For example, in Somaliland some argue that “the Turkish do not under-
stand how Somalia collapsed, it was due to the marginalisation of Somaliland. Somali-
landers will defend their sovereignty – helping only Mogadishu will drive conflict.”244 
A politician in Puntland shares similar sentiments: “There are great risks of continuing 
to support Mogadishu alone. People’s perceptions will see injustice and inequality … 
The Somali government is based on clan conflict and a clan basis: There are clans in 
Mogadishu and clans in the region. This is why having a federal system is so important. 
If Turkey does not support such a system then there will be conflict between clans, 
within the government and with Turkey itself.”245
It should be noted that criticism of the distribution of Turkish aid has not been restricted 
to Somaliland and Puntland. A leader of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), a group 
affiliated to the Federal Government, complained in 2012 that “We see [the Turks] in 
Mogadishu and hear about them, but we never meet with them”.246 Criticism has in  
the past also come from leaders from Galmudug and Ximan and Xeeb.247 Given that 
tensions over the formation of administrative regions in South-Central Somalia are 
currently running high, this may be a particular risk for Turkey over the coming years.
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The perceived imbalance of Turkish aid risks damaging its image, which ultimately 
undermines the country’s soft power and diplomatic credibility to foster peace and 
reconciliation processes. For example, while the type of aid it has provided to Somalia 
is widely commended in Somaliland, some are suspicious as to where the Turkish  
government’s political sympathies lie and question whether it can be a neutral facilitator  
of talks between Mogadishu and Hargeisa.248
Turkish aid actors are learning from their experiences in Somalia, and TIKA has  
committed to expand its engagement outside of Mogadishu. While this will mitigate 
some of the risks associated with the Mogadishu-centric approach of the past few 
years, experience suggests that this will bring challenges of its own. For example,  
politicians in Puntland point to a case in August 2013 when a Turkish aid shipment to 
the region was rejected because it was organised by the Federal Government through  
a Mogadishu-based contractor. They argue that Puntland’s own authorities, using  
contractors from Puntland, should have been responsible.249 At the time, Puntland 
authorities claimed that they would ask the Turkish government to explain the  
“politicised violation that Turkey has become part of ”.250 Opinions over what future 
role Somalia’s Federal Government should play in overseeing Turkey’s aid to different 
parts of Somalia and Somaliland remain divided: Some suggest that it should play an 
oversight role. Others suggest all aid must go through the Federal Government,  
arguing that a ‘dual track’ approach will keep Somalia divided. In Somaliland, some 
simply state that “two enemies cannot eat together. We cannot have aid shared with 
Mogadishu or from Mogadishu.”251
Some observers question whether the boundaries between Turkish aid and business 
interests are sufficiently transparent and whether they undermine its government’s 
stated commitment to impartiality and Somalia’s development.252 Given Turkey’s close 
relationship with the Federal Government, questions have already been raised over  
the awarding of contracts to Turkish companies to manage Mogadishu’s airport and 
seaport.253 Both concessions are lucrative and, arguably, highly politicised assets.  
The danger here is that Turkey’s aid is seen as linked to the winning of contracts by 
Turkish companies, undermining not only its own image and neutrality but also  
perpetuating a culture where the abuse of public office is tolerated.
Aid agency coordination is a persistent challenge in all conflict-affected states, including  
Somalia, and the multiple Turkish aid agencies operating there face similar challenges.  
While senior politicians point to Somalia as an example of Turkey’s multi-track 
approach in action, one NGO worker suggests that “in reality multi-track did not work 
well after the initial response to the famine”.254 The fact that several Turkish hospitals 
have been built in close proximity to one another by different agencies is highlighted as 
an example of poor inter-agency coordination. Furthermore, some NGO aid workers 
feel that they have had few opportunities to be consulted by officials on the Turkish 
government’s overall approach.255 Turkish officials admit they are still improving  
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coordination between multiple state agencies in addition to trying to create mechanisms  
for coordination with civil society.256
The Turkish government and Turkish NGOs have faced similar challenges in  
coordinating with other international agencies. One obstacle has been simple geography,  
with a plethora of international aid coordination meetings being largely held, until 
recently, in Nairobi (though it should be noted that the Turkish government also  
maintains an embassy there). Another challenge is the sheer number of coordination 
processes, which several Turkish officials and NGOs interviewed suggested could be 
time consuming and ultimately distracting. Low capacity constrained their ability to  
engage meaningfully. Furthermore, some within the international donor coordination 
system acknowledge that it is monopolised by traditional donors and built around 
what could be seen as a largely Western-oriented outlook. They suggest that it is  
somewhat presumptuous to expect Turkish actors to coordinate on these terms.257
At the same time, there is a strong perception among Western donors and civil society 
actors that Turkish agencies – at least initially – sought to distance themselves from 
partnership or association with other countries and instead focused on direct bilateral 
engagement on the ground.258 This may have not only jeopardised the effectiveness 
of aid, but reduced chances for mutual learning, information sharing and joint risk 
reduction to ensure that aid does not inadvertently fuel conflict. One analyst argued 
in 2012 that “bypassing the traditional mechanisms for aid delivery in Somalia did not 
make [Turkish aid agencies] more effective; it just created the conditions for that aid to 
be captured by mafia-types in the TFG and elsewhere. I’m not a great defender of the 
Somalia aid industry. But there’s no other mechanism [in the country] that delivers aid 
better. Solo efforts in Somalia don’t work.”259
“[The Turkish] now have goodwill and a generous reputation. They need to capitalise on 
the momentum they have created – but now provide more strategic support, adopt do no 
harm principles and understand the conflict better. They responded very quickly, but they 
now need to be more responsive and careful while being engaged with different political 
blocs.” 260
Looking forward, there are numerous opportunities for the Turkish government and 
Turkish NGOs to ensure that their aid contributes to long-term peace and stability in 
Somalia. It needs to be acknowledged that Turkey’s positive reputation and substantial 
engagement in the country put it in a strong position to do this but that the honey-
moon period of Turkey-Somalia relations will not last forever.
Turkish aid actors are, in general, keen to deploy aid in active support of peace. It is 
unlikely that all will seek to engage directly on conflict issues, with some actors seeing  
this as beyond their mandate. However, at government level, there appears to be  
political willingness to orient aid towards peacebuilding: senior officials frequently 
assert that their aid to Somalia intends to go beyond meeting relief or development 
needs and promote peace and stability in line with the objectives of Turkey’s approach 
to mediation and security cooperation. Some Turkish NGOs are explicit about taking  
a ‘multidimensional approach’. As one Turkish aid worker explains, many believe “that 
the humanitarian is humanitarian, diplomacy is diplomacy, relations are relations,  
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peacebuilding is peacebuilding, all these are separate and going to different directions.  
[But] we believe that all of them need to go together; they mustn’t be separate.”261 
While other Turkish NGOs do not focus so explicitly on peacebuilding, they are at 
least aware of the links between their interventions and peace.
However, it appears that most Turkish aid actors are not yet running projects explicitly 
focused on peacebuilding, or actively shaping the design and implementation of their 
aid projects to maximise their positive impact in promoting peace. TIKA officials, for 
example, state that peacebuilding issues fall under the mandate of the Turkish embassy 
and that, aside from support for statebuilding, its projects are primarily focused on 
relief and development.262 It is unclear how aligned these efforts are with the govern-
ment’s wider engagement on Somalia’s conflict dynamics or whether it is believed that 
support for development is, alone, a sufficient contribution to peace. For their part, 
while at least one Turkish NGO has been involved in mediation, the majority of NGO 
aid is largely restricted to relief, the provision of public services, training or charitable 
donations.
This suggests that opportunities are being missed: Turkish aid agencies are especially 
well placed to play peacebuilding roles given their presence on the ground, the trust 
that they have built up with Somali stakeholders and their unique identity. As such, 
it is important that a range of Turkish aid actors reassess how they can increase the 
positive impact of their aid. A number of recommendations can be identified in three 
areas: conflict sensitivity, statebuilding and partnerships.
The wide array of Turkish humanitarian, development and statebuilding projects 
being delivered on the ground in what remains a profoundly conflict-affected context 
inevitably carries risks that aid will do harm. Therefore Turkish government agencies, 
led by TIKA, and NGOs providing assistance would do well to adopt more conflict-
sensitive approaches and practices in the design and delivery of their aid. Conflict  
sensitivity can be used as a framework to reduce risks, as well as helping aid agencies  
actively to contribute to peacebuilding. In this way, the array of projects being delivered  
by different Turkish actors could add up to a significant contribution to long-term 
peace in Somalia.
Adopting more conflict-sensitive approaches would require three steps, which apply 
equally to dynamics between South-Central, Puntland and Somaliland, within these 
different regions and at the community level. First, Turkish actors would need to  
deepen their understanding of relevant conflict issues and dynamics. Second, they 
would need to assess how their aid projects currently interact with the identified  
conflict dynamics: do they exacerbate or reduce negative dynamics? Third, based on  
this assessment, they should take action to minimise risks and maximise opportunities 
to build peace through their interventions. Many Turkish aid organisations appear 
well placed to adopt all of these steps.
  Deepen knowledge and analysis of conflict dynamics
To begin with, some Turkish aid actors have already demonstrated a commitment to 
deepen their understanding of Somali conflict dynamics. Government representatives 
stress that their officials have increased their understanding of Somalia as they have 
deepened their engagement in the country.263 Those from NGOs who have remained 
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on the ground for a significant amount of time demonstrate a strong awareness of  
conflict dynamics.264
The knowledge that has been developed through time and experience now needs to 
be supplemented with up-to-date research and analysis on conflict dynamics. Few, if 
any, TIKA officials or NGO workers appear to be using conflict analysis in a structured 
way to inform aid programming. Furthermore, existing knowledge could be vastly 
strengthened through extending and deepening structured consultation on aid and 
conflict with a wider set of stakeholders beyond authorities, including Somali NGOs, 
youth groups, women’s groups, elders, professional associations and religious figures. 
Turkish officials maintain that they already engage actively with civil society, though 
the frequency and extent of this consultation – and whether it focuses on aid and  
conflict issues – is open to question. Consultation with civil society varies between 
Turkish NGOs, though some Somali civil society organisations see this as a general 
weakness and point to specific cases where Turkish NGOs missed opportunities to 
engage with them before delivering aid projects.265
It is crucial that knowledge on conflict dynamics is shared between, and made accessible 
to, all aid actors; it should not need to be developed all over again with every new  
Turkish arrival in Somalia. Understanding of conflict dynamics could be instituted at 
all levels of government and non-government agencies, but is especially important for  
those tasked with identifying, planning and overseeing the implementation of projects.  
Finally, conflict analysis should not only be part of the assessment and planning  
processes, but could be integrated into monitoring and evaluating aid delivery.  
Facilitating such sharing of learning and training on conflict dynamics is a role that 
TIKA could potentially play as part of its coordinating responsibilities.
  Adapt interventions to reduce risks
Conflict-sensitive approaches will entail Turkish aid agencies assessing the potential 
impact of their aid on conflict dynamics and adapting their interventions to reduce 
risks. Again, some Turkish agencies have already demonstrated their ability to adapt. 
For example, on discovering the diversion of the flour it was providing, one Turkish  
NGO redirected it to a bakery project where it was used to generate income.266  
Another Turkish aid agency changed the way it provided food aid in IDP camps due  
to tensions around delivery points.267 Following problems with corruption, the admin-
istration of Turkey’s scholarship programme was changed to ensure that only legitimate  
candidates were awarded places.268 While these may all be pragmatic responses to  
the realities of operating in Somalia, such flexibility demonstrates the capacity and 
willingness of Turkish aid actors to redesign their aid away to manage risks of fuelling 
conflict. This approach should now be pursued in a more consistent way.
The direct delivery approach of many Turkish aid agencies in Somalia may offer 
opportunities to reduce the risks of diversion into the war economy by removing the 
need for brokers, contractors and other middlemen, and by using staff on the ground 
to monitor final delivery to beneficiaries. One Turkish aid worker explains that “ships 
are coming to Mogadishu port; they are unshipping their load and going: ‘We helped 
Somalia’. Well do you know where that aid goes? And later you see that aid is being sold 
in markets. That’s why [we] organize and distribute our aid directly ourselves.”269 This 
is a view shared by many other Turkish aid workers.270 Some Nairobi-based donors 
 saferworld and istanbul policy center  39 
 271  Interview, Nairobi, 20 February 2014.
 272  For example, speaking of a scholarship programme, one aid worker explains that “for conflict resolution we think that 
education has a primary effect. That’s why we brought all those students here ... But conditionally we brought them:  
‘Go return back to your home country and serve your country but without guns.’” Interview, Istanbul, 10 March 2014.
 273  Interview, Hargeisa, 11 February 2014.
 274  The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, Final Declaration, 1 June 2012, Istanbul.
agree, with one for example arguing that “the only way to get around the war economy 
when delivering aid is to do it directly”.271
However, the reality is that some aid appears still to be diverted; greater attention 
needs to be paid to reducing it. Furthermore, other aid agencies have managed to 
ensure that assistance reaches final beneficiaries despite in some instances using a 
model of remote management in Somalia. While Turkish NGOs are unlikely to adopt 
a model of remote delivery, as they reduce their staff on the ground and increasingly 
work through Somali partners, they could benefit from learning how others have 
minimised risks. This should include a discussion around the reasons why other relief 
agencies shifted away from the direct aid model from the past.
  Bring a peacebuilding lens to aid projects
Conflict sensitivity should go beyond reducing risks to taking actions that contribute 
to peace. One approach is to integrate peacebuilding objectives into the delivery of 
projects primarily aimed at promoting development outcomes. Some aid agencies are 
already aware of such possibilities. For example, several Turkish NGOs interviewed 
see their aid projects targeted at youth – whether through schools, orphanages or 
scholarships to study in Turkey – as potentially having implications for peace, on the 
basis that education reduces the appeal of extremist ideologies and creates alternatives 
to joining armed groups.272 There are options for other Turkish aid agencies and the 
government to apply similar thinking to interventions in a range of other sectors. For 
example, if TIKA delivers infrastructure projects in regions emerging from protracted 
insecurity then an economic dividend for peace could be created through generating  
local employment and procuring locally. Of course, jobs and local benefits do not  
automatically create peace. Using conflict-sensitive practices – for example by ensuring  
employment is balanced between different clans and that local procurement processes 
are transparent – will help maximise peacebuilding benefits.
  Directly support peacebuilding processes
Turkish aid could also be used for projects that explicitly focus on peace in their  
objectives. Aid from either the Turkish government or from Turkish NGOs could  
support Somali civil society actors engaged in reconciliation processes between  
different groups and regions. In many parts of the country, these actors have already 
demonstrated their ability to act as mediators.273 Furthermore, there are a range of 
Turkish actors, from both government and civil society, who have had experience of 
supporting peace and reconciliation processes in other conflict-affected countries as 
well as within Turkey. These actors could share their expertise and experiences with 
Somali stakeholders; this is an aspect of Turkish civilian capacities that appears so far 
to have been under-utilised in Somalia.
Many other donors share the Turkish government’s belief that state weakness and  
fragility are at the heart of Somalia’s conflict. However, it is clear that in the context of  
Somalia it cannot be approached simply as a technical exercise in building the capacity 
of institutions. As the 2012 Istanbul conference declaration states from the outset, the 
foundations of successful statebuilding must not be forgotten: “For genuine peace 
to take hold in Somalia, Somali people should seek dialogue, reconciliation and 
political cooperation including in establishing inclusive, accountable and legitimate 
governance.”274 The pursuit of these outcomes must underpin Ankara’s approach to 
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statebuilding if it is to promote peace rather than fuel further conflict and repeat the 
mistakes of other donors.
  Promote accountable, inclusive and legitimate political processes
Its close relationships with Somalia’s political leadership and Turkey’s soft power mean 
that several opportunities exist for Turkey’s government to extend its current support 
for statebuilding to issues related to accountable, inclusive and legitimate political 
processes. It is already positively contributing to statebuilding processes through its 
capacity building programmes for government ministries and institutions. This kind 
of support for the development of soft infrastructure remains important, but it could  
be more explicitly focused on strengthening accountability and inclusivity mechanisms 
within state institutions in order to make them more responsive to the needs of citizens 
over the long term. For example, linked to its support for police reform, Turkey could 
extend its focus to the implementation of the rule of law and human rights outlined 
in Somalia’s constitution. Indeed, the finalisation of the constitution itself has been 
agreed between Mogadishu and its international partners as an area for support under 
the Somali Compact.
Turkey’s focus on mediation could be more explicitly linked to its support for state-
building. While elections are planned for 2016, it needs to be acknowledged that on 
their own they will not create a lasting political settlement – indeed they may create  
additional pressures on already fragile agreements between political elites in Mogadishu. 
As such, Turkish officials must continue to expend diplomatic energy on encouraging 
Somalia’s leaders to work with one another before, during and after voting. This needs 
to be extended not only beyond Mogadishu’s elite to include regional and local leaders 
from elsewhere in the country, but also to include the wider public (see below).
  Take a strong stand on corruption
Opportunities exist to address the problem of corruption directly. Mechanisms for 
reducing corruption need to become part of the public services support package to 
Somalia. For example, in order to help the government address corruption, Turkish 
officials have already voiced interest in supporting the establishment of a biometric 
identification system so that wages for civil servants can be electronically tracked.275 
There have been efforts on the part of the Federal Government and its international 
partners to implement public financial management reform to address long-standing 
concerns around levels of corruption. A Financial Governance Committee is in place 
to implement a programme designed to improve public financial and Central Bank 
management. Turkey could not only directly support this programme but also help by 
ensuring that its proposed capacity building for Somalia’s central bank is aligned with 
the programme’s overall objectives.
Corruption will not disappear overnight; it is a symptom of how Somali politics  
functions today. However, such politics have arguably been fuelled and sustained by 
international aid. As such, while Turkey’s government should and can find ways to 
directly address corruption, it must, at the very least, also ensure that its own aid is not 
fuelling it. One focus group participant argues that “given the level of corruption at the 
federal level then it is a good move for the Turkish government to end the cash aid”.276 
Doing so could undermine relations between the two governments, but Ankara needs 
to consider suspending cash aid until it is assured that efforts to address corruption are 
demonstrating results and that aid ends up being used as intended. Turkey – and all 
international donors – should be accountable not only to their own taxpayers but to 
the Somali people on whose behalf they justify their aid. As voiced in one focus group 
discussion:
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“When the donors – European, American or Turkish – bring their money, who will be 
accountable? Their aid will end up in the hands of the wrong people, either politicians or  
NGO workers. Throughout society we have wrong people who are not acting in the interests  
of Somalis but in fact they are distributing aid to their own clan. A lack of accountability 
from donors on where this money ends up is also an issue, as is lack of accountability to 
Somali people. So we need accountability from the top and the bottom.” 277
  Support a role for Somali civil society and citizens in statebuilding
Accountable, inclusive and legitimate politics can be supported from other quarters 
too. The Turkish government could build on its prior commitments to inclusive civil  
society participation through pushing the Federal Government to allow Somali society 
to play a larger role in overseeing their country’s governance and through creating 
forums and spaces for civil society and citizens to engage directly with policy makers. 
Turkish NGOs, and the Turkish government itself, could directly assist Somali civil 
society groups to play more active roles in the process of statebuilding. Indeed, some 
civil society actors see the engagement by traditional donors and NGOs in this area as  
relatively stronger, in “terms of empowering citizens to know their rights, good govern- 
ance, fighting corruption – that is a lot better than what Turkey is doing in Somalia”.278
  Carefully support emerging authorities
One of the most contentious issues of statebuilding relates to the balance of power 
between the Federal Government and future federal state and regional authorities, and 
the formation of authorities themselves. Support for this dimension of statebuilding, 
including for example through capacity building for emerging authorities, could be a 
means for Turkey to assist with the establishment of administrations that are genuinely 
inclusive and participatory. Nonetheless, the primary objective of Turkish engagement 
in this area should be to ensure that sufficient time and space exist for Somali-led  
dialogue at all levels – the process must not be pushed or rushed by external actors.  
It is also crucial that both Turkey’s government and NGOs are aware of the political 
sensitivities of aid delivery to and within emerging federal states.
  Support bottom-up institution building
A long-term commitment from Turkey’s government to support local bottom-up  
processes of institution building in Somalia may prove to be a productive investment.  
For example, it could extend its experience of working with the Mogadishu municipality  
government to other urban areas of the country. Another opportunity is for both 
TIKA and Turkish NGOs to consider how they can actively support the creation or 
strengthening of local governance structures, including at the community level, as part 
of the delivery of Turkish development projects.279 Indeed, supporting the capacity of 
beneficiaries to manage aid resources could prove an indispensable tool in taking on 
more conflict-sensitive approaches.
  Build on existing opportunities beyond Mogadishu
The increasing engagement of TIKA outside of Mogadishu presents a significant turn-
ing point for Turkey’s role in Somalia. There are clear benefits for Turkey’s soft power 
and ability to act as a neutral actor promoting reconciliation. There is a keen appetite 
for the type of aid Turkey provides in Mogadishu. This is especially the case with hard 
infrastructure projects considered to be more tangible than aid from other donors.280 
There already exist structures to guide the delivery of Turkish aid in these regions –  
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such as the Puntland Development Plan or the Somaliland National Development  
Plan – which have been formed though relatively participatory and inclusive processes.  
Those Turkish NGOs that are considering scaling up their assistance in Somalia should 
follow TIKA’s example and explore how to best reach locations beyond Mogadishu.
The multi-track approach to Somalia, which has included prominent roles for a variety 
of Turkish public agencies, NGOs and private sector actors, creates possibilities for a 
more holistic approach to helping address cycles of conflict, crisis and underdevelop-
ment within Somalia. Opportunities exist for all of these actors to work with and 
alongside one another in a way that is focused around peace. Furthermore, the multi-
track approach could be extended to include partnerships with non-Turkish actors, 
including Somali civil society and other international aid agencies.
  Carefully manage commercial actors and make economic interests transparent
In general, many Somali stakeholders interviewed voiced support for the multi-track 
approach that draws commercial ties in addition to aid as a means of catalysing  
development. They saw this as an efficient method of delivering more sustainable results 
than a purely aid-focused approach. For example, an official from the President’s Office 
suggests that Turkish aid brought stability to Mogadishu, which has in turn brought 
interest from Turkish companies, which in turn supports stability.281 The Somali  
president himself has argued that Turkey “has brought in business that changed the 
face of Mogadishu and encouraged its entrepreneurs to come to the city and transform 
state enterprises, including returning the port and the airport to profitability”.282
Nonetheless, significant risks need to be managed. TIKA’s use of commercial actors to 
implement development projects, whether Somali, Turkish or international, requires 
careful oversight while transparent and openly competitive processes and links to  
relevant international/UN risk management structures will be vital to ensuring that 
such an approach is seen as fair and does not end up repeating the patterns of the past. 
Specifically, commercial tenders should be conditional on contractors conducting 
meaningful risk assessments. Indeed, the Turkish government should make clear to 
Turkish companies that the principles of conflict sensitivity apply to commercial  
operations as much as they do to aid. Reference could be made to existing global  
principles, such as those developed by the UN Global Compact or the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.
Finally, it needs to be recognised that Turkey’s own economic objectives may not 
always be perceived as compatible with the government’s stated commitment to  
promoting development for the benefit of all Somalis. The government needs to be 
transparent about where its commercial interests start and end.
  Make peace the focal point of the multi-track approach between the state  
and civil society
The other aspect of Turkey’s multi-track approach in Somalia, coordination between 
state and civil society actors, holds significant promise for efforts to support peace.  
Yet it appears that efforts to maximise its effectiveness on the ground, including 
through deploying a range of ‘civilian capacities’, have not matched aspirations. While 
Turkish NGOs should be free to pursue independent initiatives, a stronger partnership 
between official and civil society actors could be catalysed around the promotion of  
peace in as it was in response to the famine in 2011. Formal opportunities for discussion  
between different government agencies and NGOs should be created in both Mogadishu 
3. Construct stronger 
partnerships around 
peace
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and Ankara. This will not only facilitate coordination, but allow for the sharing of 
information and lessons learned. In the spirit of a true two-way partnership, Turkish 
civil society actors must have opportunities to shape the government’s strategy and 
ensure that it is reflective of a wider set of perspectives outside of the state and  
genuinely multi-track.
  Develop partnerships with Somali NGOs
While there are several examples of existing partnerships, one area where both the 
Turkish government and NGOs could also maximise their impact is by working more 
closely with local NGOs, which Somali civil society actors argue will provide them 
with guidance on local needs and extend their reach to other areas of the country.283 
Indeed, some suggest that as Turkey extends its reach into new areas such as Somali-
land, where there is already substantial civil society capacity, it should avoid directly 
implementing projects but instead use the opportunity to support local NGOs and 
support sustainability and local ownership.284 Again, there are clear considerations to 
be made with regard to the benefits and costs of direct implementation. Furthermore, 
as many in Somali civil society are quick to stress, Turkish aid agencies will need to 
choose their partners carefully and transparently in a way which is informed by  
sufficient knowledge of conflict dynamics and the role of different actors.
  Work alongside and with other international donors
While not necessarily the fault of Turkish officials or NGOs, the past low levels of 
engagement between them and other international actors need to be addressed. At a  
basic level, this will enhance development effectiveness. But there are added benefits. 
In the words of one aid worker, “we need to complement one another’s strengths 
and mitigate our weaknesses – this is what effective coordination means.”285 Turkish 
approaches to aid delivery in Somalia have differed in some ways from that of others,  
meaning that the potential for mutual strengths to be accentuated through coordination 
is significant. Turkish actors have considerable experience to acquire from those who 
have been engaged in Somalia at a significant scale for a sustained period. On the  
other hand, other international actors could benefit from understanding how Turkish 
agencies have managed their recent but ambitious engagement in Somalia, what  
challenges they have faced and how these have been overcome. Other donors may 
soon follow in the footsteps of Turkish aid agencies, expanding the ambition of their 
own development projects while increasing operations on the ground.
It is welcome that Turkish NGOs state that they will increasingly seek to participate 
in aid coordination structures, notably in humanitarian clusters. Given its reputation 
with Somalia, Turkey’s government is well-positioned to take a confident approach to 
active partnership with other countries. Somali stakeholders frequently recommend 
that Turkey shares its approach to aid with other donors and encourages them to  
follow its example. Meanwhile, some Nairobi-based donors have not only urged  
Turkey to take part in coordination processes, but in some cases to lead them.286 There 
are clear opportunities for Turkey’s government to work with and through existing 
coordination structures, as it has already been doing to some extent with regard to the 
Somali Compact. Implementation of the New Deal’s principles into practice through 
the Compact has been challenging in the Somali context, but the framework remains 
the most useful tool for bringing together international and Somali stakeholders 
around a common set of objectives.287 It merits Turkey’s full participation.
 288  Op cit. Özkan (2014), p 48. 
 289  Op cit. ICG (2012), p 1. 
 290  In Mogadishu, there are some criticisms that not all Turkish aid promises have been fulfilled, for example regarding the 
building of a new parliament or providing new citizen IDs. Meanwhile, both Somaliland and Puntland have for some time 
been promised aid by the Turkish government. For example, after meeting the Puntland president in October 2012, Turkey 
reportedly promised to build airports, roads, and upgrade education and health facilities in Puntland. Participants in a 
focus group discussion held in Somaliland state that “We had high expectations but still we don’t have anything”. While 
things may soon change, in the past two years few of these expectations appear to have been met. It is unlikely that Turkish 
officials are entirely to blame: political leaders are bound to exaggerate what promises they have secured. Interview, Nairobi, 
7 February 2014, focus group discussion, Hargeisa, 9 February 2014, Garowe online (2012), ‘Turkish officials meet with 
Puntland President’, Garowe Online, 1 October 2012 http://allafrica.com/stories/201210020020.html accessed on  
22 October 2012.
 
Conclusion
turkish officials make clear that they have invested their aid in Somalia for 
the long run. Official assistance has shifted from humanitarian relief to the provision 
of bilateral development aid primarily focused on physical infrastructure and the 
health and education sectors. Capacity building and direct budget support has also 
been provided to the Federal Government for statebuilding. Turkish officials believe 
that they have been more willing than other donors to provide development aid 
despite ongoing insecurity. They have built close relations with senior figures in the 
Federal Government who they believe should have full ownership over development 
in their country.
Turkish NGOs in Somalia are varied in size, mandate and history. In general, they have 
focused on humanitarian relief but have also increasingly provided services, supported 
training, constructed infrastructure and delivered charitable donations, primarily  
in the health and education sectors. Many have delivered their aid directly through  
Turkish staff and volunteers on the ground, though they are increasingly working 
through Somali partner organisations and focusing on capacity building. Their aid  
has also largely been focused on Mogadishu.
Turkey is certainly a popular country in Somalia. Its engagement is perceived by many 
to have changed the aid landscape. But the honeymoon period will not last forever 
and, for their part, Turkish aid agencies are starting to suffer from ‘Somalia fatigue’.288 
Moreover, whether the Turkish government and NGOs can sustain past levels of 
funding to Somalia is an open question, with crises such as that in Syria distracting 
attention and resources. This is an important question given the high regard in which 
Turkish aid is generally held by Somalis and the huge expectations placed on Turkey 
as a result. Indeed, moderating these expectations to avoid a straining relations and 
weakening Turkey’s diplomatic credibility appears to have already been a challenge for 
the emerging donor.289 In Mogadishu, there are some criticisms that not all Turkish aid 
promises have been fulfilled while both Somaliland and Puntland have seen little of 
the aid that Turkish officials have publicly committed to for over two years now.290  
To re-energise the relationship, Turkish aid actors will need to reassess their roles and 
keep improving how they engage.
Turkey’s aid to Somalia
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Dynamics within Somalia will greatly shape how Turkish aid evolves in the future:  
an improved political and security situation would no doubt create opportunities for 
continued evolution in the direction of development and statebuilding, while a  
continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation could force Turkish aid agencies 
to revert to past practice. More broadly, it needs to be remembered that Somali stake-
holders are not passive recipients of aid. As with the country’s future direction, it will be  
Somalia’s leaders, officials and civil society that should and must primarily influence 
the impact of Turkish aid. Nonetheless, this report has identified several risks and  
opportunities for Turkish aid actors in Somalia. Addressing these risks and capitalising 
on the opportunities could represent the next progressive step in the evolution of  
Turkey-Somalia relations and, once again, demonstrate the rising power’s ability to 
alter the aid landscape for good.
Overall, a rush to deliver not only humanitarian aid but also development assistance 
on a significant scale without strong knowledge of the context or sufficient levels of 
consultation with Somali stakeholders may have left both Turkish officials and NGOs 
open to risks. As with all donors in Somalia, these include the diversion of aid into the 
war economy and the manipulation of aid by authorities and armed groups. The close 
relations built with leaders in the Federal Government may have led to the capture of  
Turkish aid by an elite, impacted on political dynamics within the country and afforded  
opportunities for corruption. Meanwhile, the concentration of aid to Mogadishu has 
risked exacerbating conflict dynamics, while undermining Turkey’s soft power in 
the rest of the country. Redressing this unbalance will itself prove a risky endeavour. 
The links between Turkish aid and commercial actors have been subject to criticism. 
Finally, low levels of coordination between different Turkish aid actors and with other 
international donors have created risks of their own.
Given Turkey’s identity and positive reputation in Somalia, various opportunities exist 
for both official and civil society aid agencies to leverage their assistance in support 
of peace. A conflict-sensitive approach could prove a useful framework for focusing 
future development projects in this direction while ensuring that any harmful impacts 
of aid are minimised. Conflict-sensitive approaches and practice will require a deeper 
understanding of the context based on conflict analysis and consultation with a wider 
number of Somali stakeholders. Turkish agencies will also need to be willing to adjust 
projects based on their potential impact on this context. While opportunities to 
reduce aid diversion into the war economy certainly exist through the direct delivery 
approach, if agencies begin to reduce their physical presence on the ground greater 
attention will need to be paid to preventing these risks.
Aid projects that Turkish aid actors are currently supporting, whether in the infra-
structure, health or education sectors, could be leveraged to support peacebuilding 
alongside development objectives. Direct support could be provided for Somali-led 
peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives, including through sharing Turkish  
expertise developed in other contexts. The Turkish government should focus on 
accountable, inclusive and legitimate political processes within its support for state-
building while continuing to encourage Somalia’s leaders to work with one another 
and the wider public towards a sustainable political settlement. Taking a stand on 
corruption and making itself more accountable – especially with regard to its direct 
budget support – will be important for the Turkish government. Facilitating mediation 
between Mogadishu and regional authorities while providing careful assistance for  
the creation of a federalised system of governance also offers significant opportunities 
for Turkey’s government to support peace. Pro-actively supporting civil society and 
citizens to play a bigger role in statebuilding and reconciliation processes might also 
prove a positive contribution, as too could support for bottom-up and localised  
Risks faced
Opportunities ahead
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institution building. Meanwhile, there are positive prospects for the delivery of Turkish  
aid to both Puntland and Somaliland. A shared focus on promoting peace could be 
used to catalyse greater effectiveness of the multi-track approach between the Turkish 
government and civil society organisations.
In addition, the effectiveness of assistance can be improved through higher levels of 
engagement between Turkish and other international donors. There are already some 
similarities between Turkey’s approach and that of the majority of Somalia’s traditional 
donors. For example, while generally more risk averse to providing direct budget  
support, traditional donors have, like Turkey, placed statebuilding at the centre of their 
engagement. Like Turkey, traditional donors increasingly see a role for commercial 
relations in promoting development alongside the provision of aid.291 Furthermore, 
many traditional donors have provided aid to the country in a similar manner to 
Turkey in the past, for example delivering relief aid directly or supporting physical 
infrastructure projects. Some of these approaches continue today, but development 
and humanitarian policies among traditional donors have since changed, with an 
increased preference of working through Somali organisations and promoting soft 
infrastructure and good governance.
Despite these parallels, it is clear that many from Somalia’s government and civil  
society view aid from Turkey in a relatively positive light. Although it is starting to 
change, the presence and visibility of Turkish aid workers in Mogadishu has been 
contrasted to the perceived sequestration of other international donor staff to Nairobi. 
Rightly or wrongly, this has been buttressed by the belief that what Turkey is delivering –  
for example roads or hospital construction – is more tangible than the types of projects 
supported by traditional donors.
On the one hand, as has been noted, there are clear downsides for traditional donors to 
revert to such an approach. For example, it is questionable whether it should be outside 
donors that are perceived to be delivering development to Somali people; or whether 
infrastructure projects can drive sustainable development without more fundamental 
changes in the responsiveness of the government to the needs to citizens. On the other 
hand, traditional donors need to also be honest about the limited positive impact their 
assistance has had in Somalia to date and confront the fact that many in the country 
have come to view the traditional ‘aid industry’ with a degree of cynicism.
As such, there is significant room for discussion and genuine mutual learning between 
Turkey and other donors. Greater levels of engagement would allow them to identify 
how their different approaches can be complementary, and how promising initiatives 
could be jointly scaled-up – as is potentially the case with Turkey’s nascent deployment 
of experts and civilian capacity. Nevertheless, all donors, including Turkey, need to 
recognise that while aid is crucial in humanitarian crises, in conditions of continued 
insecurity and violent conflict it cannot alone catalyse peace and development. There 
are risks of further entrenching the political economy of conflict in Somalia and cycles 
of periodic crisis. The damaging effects of such dynamics can be positively influenced 
only by coherent political, security, economic and development engagement by all  
outside actors, and aid cannot be an effective substitute for a coherent strategy, or 
ignore these wider considerations, if it is to have positive results. As such, and given 
that they face many of the very same risks, any engagement between Turkey and 
other international donors on aid must put its potential impact on peace and conflict 
dynamics at the centre of the conversation.
Implications for 
international donors
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The changes that have underscored Turkey’s rise to date will continue to define it in the 
future. Shifting regional and global dynamics, related to the continued fallout from the 
Arab Uprisings or wider geopolitical transfers of power, will inevitably shape Turkey’s 
international role. The nature of political stability and economic growth within Turkey 
will also matter greatly. These international and domestic dynamics are difficult to 
forecast and Turkey’s continued rise is by no means assured. However, it seems likely 
that the country will remain a key player in its wider region and, partly based on this,  
a prominent actor in international relations.
This role will continue to play out in the conflict-affected states where significant  
Turkish aid will be focused. Somalia has confirmed the benefits to Turkish aid agencies 
of having a presence on the ground in conflict zones and avoiding the sequestration or 
removal of aid workers. However, the fluctuating security situation in the country has 
forced some to withdraw and demonstrated the limitations of such an approach.  
Furthermore, the reliance on Turkish workers and direct delivery has potentially come 
at the cost of building Somali capacities.
While political and ideological conditions on Turkish aid are rejected and support for 
statebuilding is perceived to be apolitical, the realities are that aid has a political impact 
in Somalia however it is designed. This does not infer that Turkey must adopt a  
politicised approach to its aid, but does suggest that greater sensitivity should be paid 
to the fact that statebuilding conceived as a technical exercise will not automatically  
work in favour of peace. Without sufficient levels of national reconciliation, an inclusive 
political settlement and accountable and legitimate political processes, statebuilding 
will be a conflict-driving process – and aid makes a big difference to the relative power, 
influence and motivations of all political stakeholders.
In other conflict-affected contexts, such as Afghanistan, Turkey has sought to build 
capacity, especially of recipient state institutions, by deploying both civil servants and  
civil society actors to provide expertise. This civilian capacity appears not to have been  
maximised in the Somali context. While insecurity will no doubt create restrictions, 
this approach appears to offer greater benefits and fewer risks than direct budget 
support in countries such as Somalia. The approach could be further developed and 
refined in partnership between Turkish state and non-state actors, including NGOs, 
universities and think tanks.
More broadly, Turkey’s recent experience in Somalia could help enlighten and further 
develop the concept of humanitarian diplomacy. As one Turkish diplomat notes,  
“Turkey is learning, and it is learning fast.”292 Four implications from the Somalia case 
stand out for policymakers:
 n Allow aid to work for peace: There is a need for Turkey to create a much more explicit  
focus on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding within its emerging national aid strategy,  
with its aid agencies being given a mandate to integrate a focus on peace into their 
objectives and strategies. This will help to maximise the impact of its humanitarian 
and development assistance which is increasingly being focused on conflict-affected 
states.
 n Make aid coherent with other streams of engagement: There is a need for the provision  
of development aid to be more coherent with and closely tied to the other dimensions 
of the Turkish government’s broader engagement in conflict-affected states, including 
mediation efforts and its role in the security sector.
 n Strengthen the multi-track approach: Cultivating a two-way partnership of coordination 
and consultation with civil society actors through a shared focus on addressing conflict  
and insecurity could help make the multi-track approach an effective reality that  
maximises the use of Turkey’s civilian capacity.
Implications for aid to 
conflict-affected states 
and humanitarian 
diplomacy
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 n Look beyond host states: While establishing strong relationships with host governments, 
as Turkey has done in Somalia, the focus of engagement should also be on people and 
the views of a broader set of stakeholders, including civil society groups. In order to  
create more responsive governance systems over the long run, legitimacy, accountability  
and inclusiveness should be placed at the centre of support for statebuilding.
Through cementing these principles within the concept of humanitarian diplomacy, 
Turkey may well be better placed to promote stability in its wider region. In this regard, 
while also uncertain, the experience of Somalia could be another contributing factor 
shaping Turkey’s rise.
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